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THE FUTURE OF CODETERMINATION AFTER
CENTROS: WILL GERMAN CORPORATE LAW
MOVE CLOSER TO THE U.S. MODEL?
Jens C. Dammann'
INTRODUCTION
Despite some dissenting voices,2 most U.S. scholars agree that
the maximization of shareholder wealth is by far the most
important goal of U.S. corporate law.' The same cannot be said
'J.S.D. candidate, Yale Law School; LL.M., Yale Law School, 2001; Second State
Exam, Hamburg, 2000; First State Exam, Frankfurt, 1997. The author is indebted
to Professor Roberta Romano, Yale Law School, for valuable comments on an
earlier draft. This article was accepted for publication early in 2002. As a result,
the recent judgment by the European Court of Justice in Case C-208/00,
Uberseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH
(NCC), which basically confirmed the Centros-decision, could not be worked in,
because the editorial work had already progressed too far.
2 See, e.g., Trevor S. Norwitz, "The Metaphysics of Time": A Radical
Corporate Vision, 46 Bus. LAW. 377 (1991) (arguing that other constituencies are
just as important as shareholders).
3. See, e.g., MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW
97 (1995) (focusing on managerial duties); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of
the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1423, 1423-25 (1993) (arguing that the "mainstream of
corporate law" remains committed to the idea that a corporation exists primarily
for shareholder profit); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Discretion of Corporate
Management To Do Good at the Expense of Shareholder Gain -A Survey of, and
Commentary on, the U.S. Corporate Law, 13 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 7, 8 (1988) (focusing
on managerial decision-making); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-
Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1911, 1921 (1996) ("The
efficiency goal of maximizing the company's value to investors remains, in our
view, the principal function of corporate law"); D. Gordon Smith, The
Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278 (1998) (noting that most legal
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with regard to German corporate objectives.4 While scholars have
recently noted a global trend towards the maximization of
shareholder wealth as the primary goal of corporate law,5 German
corporate law continues to attach considerable importance to the
interests of other stakeholders.' Most importantly, German
corporate law is designed to serve the interests of employees as
well as those of shareholders.7 Under German codetermination
scholars believe that the shareholder wealth maximization norm is one of the
most important factors in corporate board decisions); Jonathan R. Macey, An
Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the
Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REv. 23,
36-39 (1991) (arguing against non-shareholder constituency statutes and in favor
of corporate managers and directors owing their primary fiduciary obligations to
shareholders).
4. See, e.g., KARSTEN SCHMIDT, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [CORPORATE LAW]
813 - 814 (3d ed. 1997); Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and Accountability
of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a
Crossroads, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 52 (1999) ("[C]orporate law in
Germany makes it abundantly clear that shareholders are only one of the many
stakeholders on whose behalf the managers must operate the firm."); Lawrence
A. Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptions in the Vertical Dimension of
Global Corporate Governance, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1133, 1157 (1999) (noting
that "German law takes more seriously the idea that beneficiaries of directors'
duties include corporate constituents other than shareholders .... "); Timothy L.
Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, Corporate Governance in a Global Environment: The
Search for the Best of All Worlds, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 829, 846 (2000)
("German corporate law clearly shows that managers must operate the firm for
the benefit of multiple stakeholders, not just shareholders."); Klaus J. Hopt,
Labor Representation on Corporate Boards: Impacts and Problems for Corporate
Governance and Economic Integration in Europe, 14 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 203,
208 (1994) ("Maximization of shareholders' wealth has hardly ever been the
objective of German stock corporations .... ").
5. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440-42, 449 (2001). With regard to Germany,
see Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of "Germany Inc. ": The Case of
Executive Pay, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 497, 497-505 (arguing that German corporate
law may be in a period of transition towards the U.S. model).
6. See, e.g., Bradley et al., supra note 4, at 52 (noting that shareholders
remain only one type of stakeholder that corporate managers must consider);
Cunningham, supra note 4, at 1157 (stating that although German law forbids
directors from acting contrary to shareholder interests, the interests of other
constituencies are also taken quite seriously).
7. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Corporate Directors' Accountability: The Race to
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law, employees are represented on the boards of corporations,
thereby participating in their management! This difference
between U.S. and German corporate law is closely connected to
the countries' respective conflicts of law rules.
In the U.S., corporate internal affairs are governed by the law
of the state of incorporation.9 Consequently, a corporation can
select the corporate law it finds most desirable simply by
incorporating in the corresponding state.'" Some scholars have
expressed doubt as to whether this system actually serves to
maximize shareholder wealth, arguing that the U.S. system allows
managers to pick corporate law rules that benefit them, rather than
the corporation, at the expense of shareholders. " These scholars
identify a "race to the bottom" phenomenon as states, eager to
collect incorporation fees, pass ever more management-friendly
rules in an effort to attract corporations. Others have criticized
the Bottom-The Second Lap, 66 N.C. L. REv. 171,176 n.35 (1987).
8. See infra Part II.
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302(2) (1971)
(stating general rule); see also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481
U.S. 69, 91 (1987) ("it ... is an accepted part of the business landscape in this
country for States to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define
the rights that are acquired by purchasing their shares."); Richard M. Buxbaum,
The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs Doctrine in
Corporation Law, 75 CAL. L. REv. 29, 30-32 (1987) (discussing CTS Corp.);
Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or
Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 350 (2001) ("[I]n the United States a
corporation's internal affairs... [are] governed by its state of
incorporation .... "); Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to
Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 1151, 1162 (2000) ("In the
United States, the law of a corporation's state of incorporation almost always
governs its management and control arrangements.").
10. See O'Hara & Ribstein, supra note 9, at 1162.
11. This view was first advanced in detail by William L. Cary. See William L.
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663, 665-66 (1974).
12. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REv. 3, 63
(1989) (theorizing that Delaware's laws will cause corporations to incorporate in
Delaware, and will cause other states to change their laws to compete); Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 67, 72 (1995)
(stating that "commentators... view corporate law standards as a 'race to the
bottom' in which states scramble over one another to impose the fewest
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this "race to the bottom" theory on the ground that it does not
account for the influence of capital markets: Managers have a
strong incentive to make a corporation's shares attractive to
shareholders, lest capital markets punish the corporation and, by
extension, its managers." Regardless of the theories that have
developed with regard to this topic,4 one thing has never been in
dispute: The state of incorporation doctrine, if applied without
exception, does not allow state legislatures to impose rules that
would allow workers to benefit at the expense of shareholders.
Even if some states adopted such rules, corporations would easily
avoid them by reincorporating elsewhere.'5
Unlike the U.S., most states in the European Community,'6
obligations upon corporate management in an attempt to keep and attract
incorporations that will bring valued tax revenue to the jurisdiction.").
13. The first proponent of this view was Ralph K. Winter, Jr. See Ralph K.
Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation,
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 257 (1977).
14. Some scholars have suggested that there is neither a race to the bottom
nor a race to the top. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Supply-Side Inefficiencies in Corporate
Charter Competition: Lessons from Patents, Yachting and Bluebooks, 43 U. KAN.
L. REV. 541, 543 (1995) (suggesting that even if managers demand value-
maximizing corporate law, state competition may not yield optimal results);
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1435, 1461-70 (1992)
(arguing that managers choose value-increasing rules to govern insignificantly
redistributive issues, and value-decreasing rules to govern significantly
redistributive issues as well as issues that directly affect market discipline).
15. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the
Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 3, 65 (1988) (stating that "a
corporation can avoid the effect of a particular state's law simply by
reincorporating in a state that has no such restriction.").
16. In the context of the Centros decision, some scholars use the expression
"Member States of the European Union." See, e.g., Josd Christian Cascante,
Niederlassungsfreiheit contra Sitztheorie- Goodbye "Daily Mail"? [Freedom of
Establishment v. Real Seat Doctrine- Goodbye "Daily Mail"?], 45 RECHT DER
INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT [RIW] 447, 450 (1999); Robert Freitag, Der
Wettbewerb der Rechtsordnungen im Internationalen Gesellschaftsrecht
[Regulatory Competition in International Corporate Law], EUROPAISCHE
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WiRTSCHAFTSRECHT [EuZW] 267, 268 (1999); Catherine
Hoist, Note, European Company Law After Centros: Is the EU on the Road to
Delaware?, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 323, 324 (2002). However, it should be noted
that the European Union has not replaced the European Community. Rather,
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including Germany, have traditionally adhered to what is known as
the "real seat doctrine"'7 According to this doctrine, the internal
matters of a corporation are governed by the law of the country in
which its headquarters is located."8 Thus, a corporation cannot
choose the more attractive corporate law of another member state
unless it is also willing to move its headquarters.'9 Since
headquarter relocation costs will usually outweigh the advantages
of a more attractive corporate law, corporations usually have no
choice but to accept the corporate law of the state where their
headquarters are located.' It is for this reason that Germany has
the European Community continues to exist and constitutes one of the pillars of
the European Union. See Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market
Access, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 25 n.3 (1997) (noting that "the European Economic
Community... is a constituent part of the European Union..."). While the
Member States of European Union are necessarily identical with those of the
European Community, the freedom of establishment is guaranteed in the Treaty
Establishing the European Community ("EC"). See Consolidated version of the
Treaty establishing the European Community, O.J. C 340/3 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 79
[hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by the Treaty of
Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing
the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1
(1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. Hence, in the context of this paper,
reference will be made to the European Community and not to the European
Union.
17. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
LAW 132 (1993). Only a few Member States of the European Community adhere
to the state of incorporation doctrine. In particular, the U.K., the Netherlands,
and the Scandinavian countries adhere to the state of incorporation doctrine. See
Holst, supra note 16, at 323 (stating that "[t]he Netherlands, the UK, and
Denmark subscribe to incorporation theory..."). With regard to Italy, the
situation does not seem to be entirely clear. See Hans Jirgen Sonnenberger &
Helge Grop3richter, Konfliktlinien zwischen internationalem Gesellschaftsrecht
und Niederlassungsfreiheit [Conflicts Between Rules Governing Conflicts of Laws
in Corporate Matters and the Freedom of Establishment], 45 RECHT DER
INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT [RIW] 721, 724 n.24, 732 (1999) (stating that
the Centros decision will influence the future decisions of states now complying
with the real seat rule).
18. See ROMANO, supra note 17, at 132.
19. See id.
20. See, e.g., William J. Carney, Federalism and Corporate Law: A Non-
Delaware View of the Results of Competition, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
COMPETITION AND COORDINATION 153, 169 (William Bratton et al. eds., 1996);
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been able to develop its codetermination laws, which allow
workers to participate in the management of corporations.21 While
shareholders and managers tend to resent codetermination, the
real seat doctrine does not allow them to easily avoid the relevant
laws by reincorporating elsewhere.
Due to recent developments in the law of the European
Community, namely the decision of the European Court of Justice
("Court") in Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen," it is
unlikely that the real seat rule will continue to persist in the
European Community. It is not surprising that Centros has
provoked an avalanche of publications.23
Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Regulatory Co-Opetition, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L.
235, 243 (2000).
21. See discussion infra Part III.
22. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999
E.C.R. 1-1459.
23. See, e.g., Peter Behrens, Das Internationale Gesellschaftsrecht nach dem
Centros-Urteil des EuGH, PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS 19
[IPRAX] 323 (1999); Georg Borges, Die Sitztheorie in der Centros-Ara:
Vermeintliche Probleme und unvermeidliche Anderungen [The Real Seat Doctrine
in the Centros-Era: Alleged Problems and Inevitable Changes], 46 RECHT DER
INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFr [RIW] 167 (2000); Cascante, supra note 16, at
451 (1999); Werner Ebke, Das Schicksal der Sitztheorie nach dem Centros-Urteil
des EuGH [The Fate of Real Seat Doctrine After European Court of Justice's
Centros-Decision], 54 JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 646 (1999). ; Freitag, supra note 16,
at 267 (1999); Stefan Korn & Christian Thaler, Das Urteil des EuGH in der Rs
Centros: Ein Meilenstein fir das europiiische Gesellschaftskollisionsrecht?[The
Centros-decision of the European Court of Justice-a Landmark Decision
Regarding the Rules Governing Conflicts of Laws in Corporate Matters?],
WIRTSCHAFTSBLATrER [WIBLI 247 (1999); Ulrich Forsthoff, Niederlassungsrecht
fir Kapitalgesellschaften nach dem Centros-Urteil des EuGH: Eine Bilanz
[Freedom of Establishment for Corporations After the Centros-decision of the
European Court of Justice: A Survey], EUROPARECHT [EuR] 176 (2000); Horst
Hammen, Zweigniederlasssungsfreiheit europiischer Gesellschaften und
Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer auf Unternehmensebene [Branch Offices of
European Corporations and Codetermination on the Level of the Enterprise], 45
WERTPAPIER-MITrEILUNGEN [WM] 2487 (1999); Barbara H6fling, Die
Sitztheorie, Centros und der 6sterreichische OGH, EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIF
FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [EuZW] 145 (2000); Otto Sandrock, Centros: Ein
Etappensieg fir die Oberlagerungstheorie [Centros: A Stage Victory for the Theory
of Superimposement], 54 BETRIEBSBERATER [BB] 1337 (1999); Ernst Steindorff,
Centros und das Recht auf die giinstigste Rechtsordnung [Centros and the Right to
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What is surprising, however, is that scholars have all but
ignored what may be the single most relevant question in the wake
of Centros: Will Germany be able to keep its codetermination laws,
thereby ensuring that German corporate law focuses on the
interests of workers as well as shareholders?24 The most extensive
discussion of the question, in an article by Horst Hammen
("Hammen"), does not exceed three pages.' Hammen, whose
approach will be discussed in detail in Part Three, comes to a
negative conclusion. 6 He argues that under Centros, corporations
are free to choose their state of incorporation and that the German
legislature cannot impose codetermination on corporations
incorporated in another member state.2 7
This article holds the opposite to be true. It argues that the
Choose the Most Attractive Legal System], 54 JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 1140 (1999);
Peter Ulmer, Schutzinstrumente gegen die Gefahren aus der Gewerbstiatigkeit
inliandischer Zweigniederlassungen von Kapitalgesellschaften mit fiktivem
Auslandssitz [Protective Mechanisms Against the Risks Resulting from the
Activities of Domestic Branch Offices of Pseudo-Foreign Corporations], 54
JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 662 (1999); Daniel Zimmer, Internationales
Gesellschaftsrecht und Niederlassungsfreiheit: Das Riitsel vor der Ldsung? [Rules
Governing Conflicts of Laws in Corporate Matters and the Freedom of
Establishment A Riddle About to be Solved?], 55 BETRIEBS-BERATER [BB] 1361
(2000); Gilson, supra note 9, at 350-56; Klaus Eicker, In the Centros Case the ECJ
Delivered a Decision with Far-reaching Implications for Company Law and Tax
Law, 27 INTERTAX 391 (1999).
24. Relatively few of the articles dealing with Centros address the decision's
implication for the German law of codetermination. But see Zimmer, supra note
23, at 1365-66 (voicing doubts that the German system of codetermination is
justified by an imperative requirement in the sense of the European Community
law). According to Ulmer, supra note 23, at 663, it is hard to imagine that
individuals intending to form a corporation large enough to fall under the
statutes on codetermination would opt to form a pseudo-foreign corporation
under the law of a state following the state of incorporation doctrine; see also
Gilson, supra note 9, at 356 (stating that the combination of German tax and
corporate law make it hard to imagine that, for large German corporations, "the
value of the more attractive governance features of the corporate law of another
EC member state would be worth the tax cost of the shift").
25. See Hammen, supra note 23, at 2493-95.
26. See id.
27. Hammen, supra note 23, at 2495; see also Lucian Bebchuck & Mark J.
Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52
STAN. L. REv. 127, 165 n.61 (1999).
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German legislature could legally, and with only minor
modifications, extend the German system of codetermination to
cover pseudo-foreign corporations, thereby protecting the German
system of codetermination from the effects of the state of
incorporation doctrine. Hence, there is no reason to believe that
German corporate law will have to follow the U.S. example of
focusing solely on the maximization of shareholder wealth.
Rather, German corporate law will be able to continue to focus on
the interests of both workers and shareholders.
Part I of this article summarizes the Centros decision and the
resulting controversy in European and U.S. legal scholarship. Part
II provides a short overview of the German system of
codetermination. Part III argues that the German law of
codetermination restricts the freedom of establishment. Part IV
focuses on the question of justification and comes to the conclusion
that the German system of codetermination is likely to pass
scrutiny by the European Court of Justice. The Conclusion
contains a brief summary of the preceding parts.
I. THE REAL SEAT RULE AND THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Article 43(1)(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community ("EC Treaty") gives European Citizens the right of
"freedom of establishment," allowing them to establish themselves
in the territory of other Member States.28 Article 48 of the EC
Treaty extends this right to corporations by providing that
"[c]ompanies ... formed in accordance with the law of a Member
State... [must] be treated in the same way as natural persons who
are nationals of Member States."29
The real seat doctrine can have rather harsh consequences for
a corporation moving its headquarters from one Member State to
another. For example, if a U.K. company moves its headquarters
to Germany without reincorporating under German law, German
courts will usually treat the organization as a partnership, exposing
all its shareholders to unlimited liability under section 128 of the
28. EC Treaty, supra note 16, art. 43(1)(1).
29. Id. art. 48.
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German Commercial Code."
Against this background, European scholars have long been
discussing the question of whether the real seat rule is compatible
with the law of the European Community. 31 Some argued early on
that the real seat doctrine violates the freedom of establishment.32
In 1989, the Court's famous Daily Mail decision33 seemed to reject
30. See, e.g., Carsten Thomas Ebenroth & Achim Sura, Das Problem der
Anerkennung im Internationalen Gesellschaftsrecht - Feststellung der
Rechtsfihigkeit und Bestimmung des Personalstatuts [The Problem of Recognition
the Conflict of Law Rules Regarding Corporations - Confirmation of Legal
Capacity and Determination of Personal Statute], 43 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALS PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 315, 317
(1979); Gerfried Fischer, Haftung ftir Scheinauslandsgesellschaften (zu LG
Stuttgart, 31.7.1989-7 0 64/89) [The Liability for Debts of Pseudo-Foreign (A
Comment on LG Stuttgart 31.71989-7 0 64/89 )], 11 PRAXIS DES
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS [IPRAX] 100, 101 (1991); see generally Gilson,
supra note 9, at 356.
31. See, e.g., DOMINIK SCHNICHELS, REICHWEITE DER
NIEDERLASSUNGSFREIHEIT [THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE FREEDOM OF
ESTABLISHMENT] 155-99 (1995) (arguing that the real seat doctrine violates the
freedom of establishment); Carsten Thomas Ebenroth, Neuere Entwicklungen im
deutschen internationalen Gesellschaftsrech [Recent Developments Regarding the
German Rules Governing Conflicts of Laws in the Field of Corporate Law], 43
JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 18, 24 (1988) (suggesting that the real seat doctrine does
not violate Article 43 EC); Bernhard Grop3feld, Die "ausliindische juristische
Person & Co. KG" [The Limited Partnership with a Foreign Corporation as
General Partner], 6 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS [IPRAX] 351,
355 (1986) (arguing that the real seat doctrine does not violate Article 43 EC);
Rainer Deville, Anmerkung zum Beschlu3 des Bayerischen Obersten
Landesgerichts vom 18.71985 - BReg. 3Z 62/85 [A Comment On the Decision of
the Bavarian Supreme Court from July 18, 1985 - BReg. 3Z 6285], 32 RECHT DER
INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT [RIW] 298, 298-99 (1986) (opining that the real
seat rule never complied with the Zeitgeist of the European Union); see also
Werner F. Ebke, Centros - Some Realities and Some Mysteries, 48 AM. J. COMP.
L. 623, 624 (2000) (describing potential conflicts between the real seat law and
Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty); Maria Chetcuti Cauchi, The European
Company Statute: Freedom of Movement of the Socities Europea, at
http://www.chetcuticauchi.com/mcc/research/freedom-of-movement-european-
company.htm (2001) (discussing tensions between the real seat doctrine and the
incorporation theory in determining what system of law governs a company's
activities) (last visited October 25, 2002).
32. See, e.g., SCHNICHELS, supra note 31, at 19; Ebke, supra note 31, at 649.
33. Case C-81/87, The Queen v. HM Treasury and Commissioners of Inland
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this view, confirming the legality of the real seat doctrine under
European Community law.34
However, in 1999, the Centros decision profoundly changed
the landscape of German incorporation law. The facts of the case
are simple: Two Danish nationals, Mr. and Mrs. Bryde, decided to
start a corporation.35 However, under Danish law, this would have
required a minimum capital of 200,000 Danish Crowns (about
$23,500 U.S. dollars).36 Given that no such minimum capital
requirement existed in the U.K.,7 Mr. and Mrs. Bryde abstained
from forming a corporation in Denmark and instead set up a
company in the U.K. 38  However, the newly formed company,
Centros Ltd., never conducted any business in the U.K. 39 Rather, it
directly requested that an office branch be registered in Denmark."
The competent Danish authorities rejected this request, arguing
inter alia, that the whole scheme was aimed at the circumvention of
Revenue ex parte Daily Mail & General Trust plc, 1988 E.C.R. 5483.
34. See Clark D. Stith, Federalism and Company Law: A "Race to the
Bottom" in the European Community, 79 GEO. L. J. 1581, 1603 (1991) (discussing
Daily Mail's holding that "although the 'freedom of establishment constitutes
one of the fundamental principles of the Community,' the question of company
recognition remains essentially one of national and not community law" (quoting
Daily Mail 1988 E.C.R. 15 )); Holst, supra note 16, at 328 (noting that, under
the Daily Mail decision, companies did not have "a right to transfer their central
management to another Member State while retaining their legal status in the
first Member State"); Cf., e.g., Uwe Kindler, Niederlassungsfreiheit fUr
Scheinauslandsgesellschaften? Die Centros-Entscheidung des EuGH und das
internationale Privatrecht [Freedom of Establishment for Pseudo-foreign
Corporations? The Centros-decision of the European Court of Justice and the
Rules Governing Conflicts of Laws in Corporate Matters], 52 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1993, 1996 (1999).
35. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999
E.C.R. 1-1459, T 3.
36. Id. 7.
37. Id. 3.
38. Mr. and Mrs. Bryde never actually admitted an intention to circumvent
Danish law, but Mr. Bryde conceded that "it is certainly easier to find £ 100 than
DKK 200 000." See the Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola, Centros Ltd.,
1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, 3.
39. Centros Ltd., 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, 3-7.
40. Centros Ltd. was registered on May 18, 1992 in England and Wales, and
requested registration of its Danish branch in the summer of 1992. See id. 2, 6.
2003] THE FUTURE OF CODETERMINATION 617
Danish corporate law.'
Centros Ltd. sued, alleging a violation of the freedom of1 2
establishment. The Court agreed. It held that:
It is contrary to Articles [43 (ex-Article 52)] and [48 (ex-Article
58)] of the EC Treaty for a Member State to refuse to register a
branch of a company formed in accordance with the law of
another Member State in which it has its registered office but in
which it conducts no business where the branch is intended to
enable the company in question to carry on its entire business in
the State in which that branch is to be created, while avoiding
the need to form a company there, thus evading application of
the rules governing the formation of companies which, in that
State, are more restrictive as regards the paying up of a
minimum share capital."
The Centros decision has provoked an avalanche of responses
in legal publications." Most of them deal with the question of
whether the decision effectively puts an end to the real seat
doctrine. 5 According to the prevailing view, this question must be
answered in the affirmative: Once a corporation has been validly
established in one Member State, other Member States must
recognize the corporation as validly formed, lest they violate the
corporation's freedom of establishment." The minority view in the
41. Id. T1 7.
42- Id. 3.
43. Id. 14.
44. See sources cited supra note 23.
45. See, e.g., Cascante, supra note 16, at 450-51; Ebke, supra note 23, at 660;
Thaler, supra note 23, at 250-54; Zimmer, supra note 23, at 1364-65; Eicker,
supra note 23, at 392.
46. See, e.g., Freitag, supra note 16, at 268-69 (stating that Member States
must recognize a corporation formed in any other Member State provided that
the corporation was validly formed according to the laws of its home State);
Sandrock, supra note 23, at 1341 (arguing that with respect to corporations from
other Member States of the European Community, the real seat doctrine belongs
to the realm of "legal history"); Kom & Thaler, supra note 23, at 254 (stating that
many corporations will take advantage of freedom of establishment by
establishing outside of their home state). Some authors, while critical vis-A-vis
the legality of the real seat doctrine under European Community law, adopt a
more careful position. See, e.g., Borges, supra note 23, at 176 (suggesting that the
real seat doctrine will have to be modified); Cascante, supra note 16, at 451
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literature interprets Centros more narrowly. According to this
view, the Court's holding is only relevant to those Member States
that, like Denmark and the U.K., generally adhere to the state of
incorporation doctrine."
This article does not aim to resolve this controversy. Rather, it
simply assumes the validity of the prevailing view that the Court's
holding in Centros applies to all Member States, not just to those
adhering to the state of incorporation doctrine. Against the
background of this assumption, the focus of this article is on the
implications of Centros for the German system of codetermination.
II. THE GERMAN CODETERMINATION LAW
As scholars often note, German codetermination law is highly
complicated." For the purpose of this article, however, it is
(arguing that it will not be possible to continue to apply the real seat doctrine "in
its present form"); Eicker, supra note 23, at 392 (suggesting that it is time to
"rethink" the applicability of the real seat doctrine).
47. See, e.g., Ebke, supra note 31, at 658, 660; Kindler, supra note 34, at 1996.
Cf also Holst, supra note 16, at 327 (stating that legal scholars such as Wulf-
Henning Roth and Werner Ebke read Centros narrowly). The arguments
advanced in support of this view vary. The most popular line of reasoning can be
summed up as follows: In Centros, the Court held that if a Member State follows
the state of incorporate doctrine, and hence chooses to recognize the legal
personality of a foreign corporation, then the Member State cannot restrict the
corporation's freedom of establishment without justification. Centros Ltd. v.
Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459. However, the Court has not
addressed the question of whether a Member State has to recognize the legal
personality of foreign corporations in the first place. See Ebke, supra note 23, at
658 (arguing that Daily Mail leaves open the question of when a Member State
must recognize an out-of-state corporation); Holst, supra note 16, at 329
(acknowledging Ebke's argument).
48. See, e.g., ALFRED HUECK, GESELLSCHAFSRECHT [CORPORATE LAW] 32,
§ 4 2 (19th ed. 1991); Susan-Jacqueline Butler, Models of Modern Corporations:
A Comparative Analysis of German and U.S. Corporate Structures, 17 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 555, 562 (2000) (noting the potentially numerous requirements
of codetermination laws and how they affect supervisory boards in Germany);
Friedrich Kfibler, Comment, Corporate Governance: On Mark Roe, German
Codetermination and German Securities Market, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 213, 218
(1999) (noting that codetermination has become an "increasingly complex and
ambivalent issue").
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sufficient to summarize a few basic principles. To begin with, the
German system of codetermination functions by giving workers a
voice in the supervisory boards of corporations.49 It should be
recalled in this context that under sections 76-117 of the German
Stock Corporation Act," German public corporations have a two-
tier board structure. The managing board is responsible for day-to-
day operations." By contrast, the supervisory board is, inter alia,
responsible for appointing and supervising the managing board.52
The corporation's shareholders generally elect at least half of the
members of the supervisory board." The remaining members are
elected by the corporation's employees. The exact number of
board members elected by the workers depends on which
codetermination statute is applicable. Limited liability companies
usually have a single board." However, inasmuch as they fall under
one of the codetermination statutes, they are legally obliged to
form a supervisory board, so that the above-described system can
apply to them as well.
At present, the German law of codetermination is contained in
several different statutes. The oldest one is the Coal and Steel
Codetermination Act of 1951,"5 which was supplemented by the
Supplementary Act to the Coal and Steel Codetermination Act in
1956.56 It applies to public corporations and limited liability
49. See Hazen, supra note 7, at 176 n.35.
50. Aktiengesetz from September 6, 1965, BGBI. 1 1089 [hereinafter Stock
Corporation Act].
51. See id. § 76(1).
52. See id. §§ 84(1), 111(1).
53. Cf. id. §§ 101(1), 118(1) (stating that the shareholders of a public
corporation can only elect those members of the supervisory board who are not
elected as workers' representatives under the codetermination statutes).
54. See Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschrankter Haftung
(GmbHG) [Limited Liability Company Act] § 52.
55. Gesetz iber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in den Aufsichtsriten
und Vorstanden der Unternehmen des Bergbaus und der Eisen und Stahl
erzeugenden Industrie [Law Pertaining to the Participation of Workers in the
Supervisory Boards and Managing Boards of Companies in the Coal, Iron and
Steel Industries] from May 21, 1951, Bundesgesetzblatt I 341 [hereinafter Coal
and Steel Codetermination Act].
56. Gesetz zur Ergdnzung des Gesetzes iber die Mitbestimmung der
Arbeitnehmer in den Aufsichtsr~iten und Vorstdnden der Untemehmen des
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companies in the steel, iron, coal and supporting industries,
provided that these companies employ more than 2,000 workers. 7
Under section 4(1) of the statute, the supervisory board of the
corporation consists of eleven members." Five of them are elected
by the shareholders,59 and five are elected by the workers.' The
eleventh member, the so-called "neutral member," is elected by
the shareholders, but must also be confirmed by at least three of
the five shareholders' representatives and, more importantly, by
three of the five workers' representatives.'
The most recent statute on codetermination is the
Codetermination Act of 1976.62 It applies to various types of legal
entities formed under German law including public corporations
and limited liability companies, 63 provided that these entities
employ more than 2,000 workers.' Exempt are entities that fall
under the Coal and Steel Codetermination Act 65 as well as political
or charitable organizations, and news media organizations.6 Every
corporation falling under the Codetermination Act has to form a
supervisory board, if it does not already have one.67  The
supervisory board has an equal number of shareholder and
employee members.68 However, for two reasons, the supervisory
board will tilt toward the interests of the shareholders rather than
Bergbaus und der Eisen und Stahl erzeugenden Industrie [Supplementary Act to
the Law Pertaining to the Participation of Workers in the Supervisory Boards
and Managing Boards of Companies in the Coal, Iron and Steel Industries] from
August 7, 1956, Bundesgesetzblatt I 707 [hereinafter Supplementary Act to the
Coal and Steel Codetermination Act].
57. Id. § 3(11)(2).
58. Coal and Steel Codetermination Act, supra note 55, §4(1).
59. Id. §§ 4(1)(a),5.
60. Id. §§ 4(1)(b), 6(1).
61. Id. §§ 4(1), 8(1).
62. Gesetz tiber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer of May 4, 1976,
Bundesgesetzblatt BGB1 1 1153 [hereinafter Codetermination Act].
63. Id. § 1(1)(1).
64. Id. § 1(1)(2).
65. Id. § 1(2).
66. Id. § 1(4).
67. Id. § 6(1).
68. Id. § 7(1).
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the workers.6 ' First, the voting mechanism in the supervisory board
favors the shareholders' representatives. If the board members
cannot agree on a chairperson, the shareholders' representatives
elect the chairperson." This is significant because the chairperson
has an additional vote whenever the supervisory board is
deadlocked." Second, at least one of the workers' representatives is
elected by managerial employees as a separate group. Obviously,
the interests of managerial employees are not necessarily in line
with those of "ordinary" workers. 2
Legal entities that do not fall under either of the two above-
mentioned statutes may be subject to the so-called Industrial
Constitution Act of 1952.' 3 The Industrial Constitution Act of 1952
applies to most legal entities, including public corporations and
limited liability companies. 4 The threshold number of workers is
500."5 The legal consequences of falling under the Industrial
Constitution Act of 1952 are comparatively mild. The statute gives
the corporation's employees the right to elect one third of the
members of the supervisory board.76
Under Centros, the German statutes on codetermination in
their present form are easy to avoid. The relevant German statutes
only apply to specific types of corporations formed under German
law." This does not only follow from the wording of the various
69. Cf., e.g., FRIEDRICH KUBLER, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [CORPORATE LAW]
551 § 32(III)(2)(c) (5th ed. 1999).
70. Codetermination Act, supra note 62, § 27(2).
71. Id. § 29(2).
72. See, e.g., MANFRED LIEB, ARBEITSRECHT [LABOR LAw] 270 § 9(I)(4)(b)
(1996).
73. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz of Jan. 15, 1952, BGB1 I 13 [hereinafter
Industrial Constitution Act of 1952].
74. Id. §§ 76(1),77(1).
75. Id. §§ 76(6), 77. However, there is a fine difference between different
types of organizations. Public corporation falls under the Codetermination Act if
the number of its employees is greater than or equal to 500. Id. § 76(6). By
contrast, other types of entities including the limited liability company only fall
under the statute if the number of employees is greater than 500. Id. §77.
76. Id. §§ 76(1), 77.
77. See, e.g., RAISER, MITBESTIMMUNGSGESETZ [THE CODETERMINATION
ACT] § 1 $ 10 (3d ed. 1998); Ulmer, supra note 23, at 663 (stating that because
there is no common codetermination law in the European Community, German
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statutes on codetermination, which all refer to specific types of
legal entities, but also from the legislative history of the statutes in
question." In the legal literature, it has been suggested that the
codetermination statutes could be applied to pseudo-foreign
corporations by means of analogical reasoning." However,
according to German legal doctrine, an analogy may only be used
to fill gaps in the texture of law that were not intended by the
legislature." Hence, it is extremely unlikely that German courts
will apply the German statutes on codetermination to pseudo-
foreign corporations.
The crucial question, therefore, is whether the German
legislature could extend the German system of codetermination to
pseudo-foreign corporations without violating Article 43(1) of the
EC. This question will be analyzed in the following parts of this
article.
III. CODETERMINATION AS A RESTRICTION ON THE FREEDOM OF
ESTABLISHMENT
Against the background of Centros, some scholars seem to
consider it obvious that the German system of codetermination
restricts the freedom of establishment of pseudo-foreign
codetermination statutes apply only to corporations formed in Germany); Angel
R. Oquendo, Breaking on Through to the Other Side: Understanding Continental
European Corporate Governance, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L. ECON. L. 975, 980 (2001)
(finding that German corporation composition dictates statute application).
78. This is particularly evident with regard to the Codetermination Act of
1976. The relevant committee report of the Committee for Labor and Social
Affairs from the year 1976 explicitly states that the Codetermination Statute of
1976 is not applicable to foreign corporations. Drucksachen des Bundestages
[BT-Drs.] 7/4845, 4.
79. See, e.g., PETER HANAU & PETER ULMER, MITBESTIMMUNGSGESETZ
[CODETERMINATION ACT] § 1 33 (1981); RAISER, supra note 77, § 1 14;
Herbert Miuffelmann, Entfiillt die Mitbestimmung fuir eine Kommanditgesellschaft
bei Einschaltung einer ausliindischen Kapitalgesellschaft? [Can a Limited
Partnership Avoid Codetermination by Including a Foreign Corporation?], 32
BETRIEBS-BERATER [BB] 628,628 (1977).
80. KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE [LEGAL METHODS] 269-279 (6th ed.
1992).
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companies." However, it must be kept in mind that the Danish
refusal to register Centros Ltd. prevented the company from
setting up its "branch office" in Denmark12  By contrast, the
application of the German statutes on codetermination would have
less far-reaching consequences. These statutes, if extended to
cover pseudo-foreign corporations, would only regulate the
manner in which such corporations can operate. Therefore, the
question arises whether this kind of obstacle would also be
considered a restriction on the freedom of establishment.
Article 43(1) of the EC Treaty was originally interpreted to
prohibit only discriminatory measures,' covering both overt and
hidden forms of discrimination. 5 In the last decade, the Court
81. See, e.g., Ulmer, supra note 23, at 663 (suggesting that because companies
formed in Germany must comply with Germany's strict codetermination law,
foreign companies are less likely to use their freedom of establishment to
incorporate in Germany); Zimmer, supra note 23, at 1365-66.
82. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstryrelsen, 1999
E.C.R. 1-1459, 7.
83. See supra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Case 182/83, Fearon v. Irish Land Commission, 1984 E.C.R.
3677, [1985] 22 C.M.L.R. 228 (holding that an Irish statute allowing for
compulsory acquisition of land where a person owning the land or, in the case of
companies, the company directors, had not been resident for more than a year
within three miles of that land fell outside Article 43 (ex Article 52) of the EC
Treaty because the measure did not discriminate against other Community
nationals); see also Case 292/86, Gullung v. Conseil de l'Ordre des Avocats, 1988
E.C.R. 111, [1988] 25 C.M.L.R. 57 (holding that member states cannot refuse to
grant the benefit of the provisions of Community law); cf. DERRICK WYAr ET
AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW 431 (2000) (arguing that the Court only started in
the last decade to apply the freedom of establishment to non-discriminatory
national measures); 2 DAMIAN CHALMERS & ERIKA SZYSZCZAK, EUROPEAN
UNION LAW 381-84 (1998) (noting that Article 43 (ex Article 52) was originally
interpreted to cover only discriminatory restrictions); MARTIN FRANZEN,
PRIVATRECHTSANGLEICHUNG DURCH DIE EUROPAISCHE GEMEINSCHAFT [THE
HARMONIZATION OF PRIVATE LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY] 173 §
5(II)(1)(a) (1999) (stating that Article 43 was originally interpreted to prohibit
only discriminatory measures).
85. See, e.g., Case C-221/89, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport ex
parte Factortame, 1991 E.C.R. 1-3905, 22-39, [1991] 26 C.M.L.R. 589 (noting
that although the requirement at issue dealt with the nationality of vessels, it led
to unlawful discrimination based on the nationality of persons); Case C-279/89,
Commission v. U.K., 1992 E.C.R. 1-5785, 45 (holding that the U.K. had
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gradually extended the scope of this provision, applying it to non-
discriminatory measures that render the exercise of the freedom of
establishment less attractive.86 However, the exact scope of this
principle and the correct interpretation of the pertaining case law
unlawfully discriminated by "excluding [certain Spanish and Portuguese
nationals] from the 75% of the crew of a fishing vessel flying the British flag
which must be composed of United Kingdom nationals or nationals of other
Member States ... and by requiring the nationals of other Member States who
form part of that 75% ... to reside ashore in the United Kingdom, Isle of Man or
Channel Islands."); Case C-330/91, The Queen v. IRC ex parte Commerzbank,
1993 E.C.R. 1-4017, 20 ("[Articles 43 (ex Article 52) and 48 (ex Article 58)] of
the Treaty prevent the legislation of a Member State from granting repayment
supplement on overpaid tax to companies which are resident for tax purposes in
that State whilst refusing the supplement to companies resident for tax purposes
in another Member State."); Case C-1/93, Halliburton Services BV v. Secretary
of State for Finances, 1994 E.C.R. 1-1137, T 23, [1994] 21 C.M.L.R. 377
("[Articles 43 (ex Article 52) and 48 (ex Article 58)] of the Treaty preclude the
law of a Member State from restricting exemption from the tax on transactions
relating to immovable property... only to cases where the company qualifying
for exemption acquires immovable property from a company constituted under
national law, and refusing to grant such relief where the transferor is a company
constituted under the law of another Member State.").
86. See, e.g., Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e
Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 37 ("National measures liable to
hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed
by the Treaty must fulfil [sic.] four conditions: they must be applied in a non-
discriminatory manner they must be justified by imperative requirements in the
general interest they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective
which they pursue and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to
attain it."); Case C-19/92, Kraus v. Land Baden-Wtirttemberg, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1663
(laying out specific guidelines for when, under the Treaty, a Member State may
only prohibit "one of its own nationals, who holds a postgraduate academic title
awarded in another Member State, from using that title on its territory without
having obtained an administrative authorization for that purpose. .. ."); Case
143/87, Stanton v. INASTI, 1988 E.C.R. 3877, 13, [1989] 26 C.M.L.R. 761
(holding that "[Articles 43 (ex Article 52) and 39 (ex Article 48)] of the Treaty
must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State may not refuse to exempt
self-employed persons working within its territory from the contributions
provided for under the national legislation on social security for self-employed
persons on the ground that the employment which is capable of giving
entitlement to such exemption is pursued within the territory of another Member
State.").
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are still in dispute.87 Therefore, it seems useful to start with the
question of whether the German system of codetermination has a
discriminatory effect before examining the likelihood that the
Court will consider the German codetermination rules to restrict
the freedom of establishment even in the absence of
discrimination.
A. Discrimination
To apply the German system of codetermination to all
German and foreign corporations that have their real seat in
Germany would not constitute overt discrimination. However, as
pointed out above,88 Article 43 of the EC Treaty is generally
interpreted to prohibit hidden forms of discrimination as well."
Hidden discrimination occurs when a statute or another measure
places the nationals of other Member States at a disadvantage vis-
A-vis the Member State's own nationals.' The question, therefore,
is whether the German system of codetermination places foreign
companies at a disadvantage as compared to German companies.
In addressing this issue, it is helpful to highlight and distinguish two
87. See, e.g., SIOFRA O'LEARY, The Free Movement of Persons and Services,
in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW (Paul Craig & Grdinne de Bdrca eds., 1998)
(distinguishing between different kinds of non-discriminatory national measures
with regard to the application of Article 43 of the EC Treaty); SCHNICHELS,
supra note 31, at 115-41(suggesting that Article 43 of the EC Treaty should
generally be applied to non-discriminatory measures that render the exercise of
the freedom of establishment less attractive); PETER TROBERG, Artikel 52, in
GROEBEN ET AL., KOMMENTAR ZUM EU-/EG-VERTRAG [TREATISE ON THE
EU/EC TREATY] 1331-1338 (5th ed. 1997) (arguing that Article 43 of the EC
Treaty is applicable to non-discriminatory measures, but suggesting that one
should be particularly careful in looking for a legitimate interest that might justify
the relevant non-discriminatory measures); WYATT, supra note 84, at 446
(arguing that the existing case law should be interpreted as holding that non-
discriminatory national measures are only prohibited if they refer to entry,
residence, or the access to self-employed activities).
88. See supra text accompanying note 85.
89. See cases cited supra note 85.
90. See, e.g., Case C-111/91, Commission v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg,
1993 E.C.R. 1-817, T 9 (noting that both overt and covert discrimination are
forbidden under the Treaty (citing Case 152/73, Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost,
1974 E.C.R. 153)); see also SCHNICHELS, supra note 31, at 89.
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different cases.
In the first case, the foreign corporation does not find it
impossible to comply with German law, but the burden from the
German system of codetermination is nevertheless greater for the
foreign corporation than for the German one. Hammen focuses
exclusively on this category.91 One can easily think of hypothetical
cases in which such an additional burden would exist. For
example, the U.K. might try to improve the protection of
shareholders by decreeing that companies which do not allow their
shareholders to elect all the members of the board have to pay
higher taxes. However, it is hard to think of actual cases in which
such additional burdens exist. Hammen attempts to show that as a
consequence of the different board structure of U.K. corporations,
workers' representatives would have greater powers in a U.K.
company than they currently have in German corporations." Yet
his reasoning does not give sufficient weight to the fact that
corporations formed under U.K. law can voluntarily adopt a two-
tier board structure. "
91. Hammen, supra note 23, at 2494.
92. Id.
93. Hammen argues that corporations formed under U.K. law are placed at a
disadvantage vis-A-vis German corporations if subjected to the German system of
codetermination. Hammen, supra note 23, at 2494. His reasoning regarding this
point can be summed up as follows: Under the German law of codetermination,
workers are represented on the supervisory board. Hammen, supra note 23, at
2493; see also Tricia Paton, Codification of Corporate Law in the United Kingdom
and European Union: The Need for the Australian Approach, 11(9) INT'L CO. &
COM. L. REv. 309, 316 (2000). The supervisory board cannot, as a rule, represent
the Corporation in dealings with third parties. Hammen, supra note 23, at 2494;
see also Arndt Stengel, Directors' Powers and Shareholders: A Comparison of
Systems, 9(2) INT'L CO. & COM. L. REv. 49 (1998) (noting that the supervisory
board monitors the management board and is not involved in the business of the
corporation). Hence, the workers' representatives do not have the capacity to act
for the corporation. Hammen, supra note 23, at 2494; see also Oquendo, supra
note 77, at 979-80 (noting that, under German law, half of the supervisory
council seats are filled by the workers, and the supervisory board does not act for
the corporation). The same is true with regard to limited liability companies.
Hammen, supra note 23, at 2493-94; see also, Richard D. English, Company Law
in the European Single Market, 1990 BYU L. REv. 1413, 1430 (1990). U.K.
companies-like U.S. corporations-have a one-tier board structure. Hammen,
supra note 23, at 2494; see also Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Some Reflections on
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German Corporate Governance: A Glimpse at German Supervisory Boards, 70
TUL. L. REV. 1819, 1821 (1996). The members of the board have the power to
jointly represent the company. Hammen, supra note 23, at 2494. Workers'
representatives would therefore be able represent the corporation, if only by
acting together with the other members of the board. Therefore, Hammen
reasons, the German system of Codetermination would affect U.K. corporations
more strongly than comparable German corporations.
However, this reasoning is unconvincing. As Hammen himself concedes, U.K.
companies, too, have the possibility to create a two-tier board system. Hammen,
supra note 23, at 2494; see also, Ben Pettet, The Combined Code: A Firm Place
for Self-Regulation in Corporate Governance, 13(12) J. INT'L BANKING L. 394,
396 (1998) (noting that while the delegation of power on some boards adopt
features similar to those found in two-tier boards, overall there is little support
for the two-tier structure in the United Kingdom). U.K. law allows companies to
create two classes of board members, one with the power to act for the
corporation, the other one without that power. Hammen, supra note 23, at 2494;
see also, Mahmut Yavasi, Shareholding and the Board Structures of German and
U.K. Companies, 22(2) Co. LAw. 47, 51 (2001) (commenting that due to the
delegation of power management by some boards, the unified board structure is
often similar to the two-tier system of German corporations). Hammen
discounts that possibility on the grounds that such provisions in the corporate
charter are without effect vis- -vis third parties. See Hammen, supra note 23, at
2494. However, given that under the default rule all board members have to act
jointly to represent the company, there is no risk that the workers'
representatives will act for the company without the consent of the managing
board.
Probably aware of this weakness in his line of reasoning, Hammen also points to
the fact that under U.K. law, a single board member may be able to represent the
company according to the principles of "apparent authority." Hammen, supra
note 23, at 2494; see also Mark Stallworthy, Directors' Duties in Selected Markets:
England and Wales, 4(2) INT'L CO. & COM. L. REv. 77, 79 (1993) (stating that
while the "authority of individual directors ... may be subject to a specific
delegation [sic].... a third party may rely on the principles of agency in
circumstances of express authority or ostensible/apparent authority .... "). At
first glance, indeed, this argument seems to make sense. A court in the U.K.
might be more likely to find such apparent authority with regard to a board
member of a British company than a German Court with regard to the members
of the supervisory board of German company. However, this comparison is
misleading. The principles governing the concept of apparent authority do not
constitute an internal affair and are therefore governed by the law of the "host"
state rather than by the law of the state of incorporation. See, e.g., BGHZ 43, 21
(27) (holding that German law governs the question of apparent authority in
cases where the appearance of authority was created in Germany and caused its
effects in Germany); ZIMMER, supra note 23, at 310 (arguing that the law of the
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In the second case, the corporate law of another Member State
simply does not allow corporations to comply with the German law
of codetermination. For example, several other Member States,
such as Sweden, have codetermination regimes that differ from,
and are often incompatible with, the German system of
codetermination." Under Swedish law, workers in companies
having twenty-five or more employees have the right to appoint
through their local union branches two members and two deputy
members to the board of directors.9" (Like U.S. corporations,
Swedish companies have a single board.)96  This right is
incompatible with the German rules that govern the election of the
workers' representatives.' Consequently, a corporation falling
under the Swedish statute in question cannot also comply with the
German Codetermination Act and is therefore put at a
disadvantage vis-A-vis German corporations.
B. Codetermination Laws as a Non-discriminatory Restriction
In light of the above-described discriminatory effects, one
might be tempted to disregard the question of whether the German
system of codetermination violates Article 43(1) of the EC Treaty
even in the absence of discrimination. However, it must be kept in
mind that even if national laws violate European Community law,
this violation does not render the national laws invalid,9" but rather
only inapplicable in cases where a violation of Community law
would otherwise occur.99 Therefore, companies formed under U.K.
state were the appearance of authority was created is applicable).
94. Uwe Blaurock, Steps Toward a Uniform Corporate Law in the European
Union, 31 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 377, 390 (1998).
95. Leroy S. Merrifield, Worker Participation in Decisions within
Undertakings, 5 CoMp. LAB. L.J. 1, 13 (1982).
96. Id.
97. See Codetermination Act, supra note 62, §§ 15, 16.
98. See, e.g., RUDOLF STREINZ, EUROPARECHT [EUROPEAN LAW] 59 200
(4th ed. 1999).
99. See, e.g., id. (arguing that community law prevails only if conflicting with
national law); THORSTEN KINGREEN, DIE STRUKTUR DER GRUNDFREIHEITEN
DES EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHTS [THE STRUCTURE OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW] 34 (1999) (stating
that national law in case of a conflict with community law will only be suspended
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law cannot avoid the application of German codetermination
statutes by showing that these statutes violate the freedom of
establishment of companies formed under Swedish law. Hence,
the German legislature might simply provide that the German
codetermination statutes are applicable to pseudo-foreign
companies, knowing full well that courts and agencies will not
apply these statutes to companies in cases where this would lead to
discrimination. Alternatively, the legislature could include a
special provision in the codetermination statutes to the effect that
these statutes do not apply to those companies that cannot comply
with them without facing an additional burden not borne by
domestic corporations.
Hence, the question remains whether the German law of
codetermination restricts the freedom of establishment even in the
absence of discriminatory effects. As mentioned above, the Court
originally assumed that only discriminatory national measures
could restrict the freedom of establishment."c In the last decade,
the Court gradually extended the scope of Article 43(1) of the EC
Treaty to prohibit non-discriminatory measures as well, holding
that "national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the
exercise of fundamental freedoms" need to be justified. 1
However, the exact scope of application of this principle is still in
dispute.102
Some scholars interpret the existing case law on non-
discriminatory restrictions of the freedom of establishment
restrictively. 3 In particular, they suggest that Article 43(1) of the
to the extent of the conflict).
100. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 84.
101. See Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e
Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 37 (1995); Case C-212/97, Centros
Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. 1-3219, 26, 27 (1999)
(holding refusal of a Member State to register a company formed under the laws
of another Member State must be justified); Case C-19/92, Kraus v. Land Baden-
Wtirttemberg, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1663, 35 (holding restrictions on authorization of
academic titles must be justified by a legitimate interest such as to protect the
public).
102. See sources cited supra note 87.
103. See, e.g., FRANZEN, supra note 84, at 176-79 § 5 II 1; WYATT, supra note
84, at 446 (discussing the application of Article 43 in existing case law); Jirgen
Basedow, Zwischen Amt und Wettbewerb-Perspektiven des Notariats in Europa
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EC Treaty only prohibits those non-discriminatory national
measures that restrict the entry into the territory of another
Member State or the access to self-employed activities."
According to this interpretation, Article 43 of the EC Treaty does
not apply to rules that govern only the conduct of a person's
business activities. 5  Given that the German system of
codetermination does not prevent pseudo-foreign corporations
from entering the market or from entering a certain line of
business, it would be able to avoid judicial scrutiny under Article
43 of the EC.
However, most scholars rightly reject the above-described
restrictive interpretation of the relevant case law as unconvincing."
[Between Public Office and Competition - Perspectives of Notary in Europe], 55
RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 409, 432-33 (1991); Hammen, supra note 23, at 2494
(arguing that non-discriminatory restrictions apply only to the freedom of
companies to choose its business location); Wulf-Henning Roth, Grundlagen des
gemeinsamen europdischen Versicherungsmarktes, 54 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 63, 82-83 (1990); Ernst
Steindorff, Reichweite der Niederlassungsfreiheit [The Scope of the Freedom of
Establishment], EUROPARECHT [EuR] 19, 20 (1988).
104. See sources cited supra note 103.
105. See sources cited supra note 103.
106. See, e.g., ASTRID EPINEY, UMGEKEHRTE DISKRIMINIERUNGEN.
ZULASSIGKEIT UND GRENZEN DER DISCRIMINATION A REBOURS NACH
EUROPAISCHEM GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHT UND NATIONALEM VERFASSUNGSRECHT
[REVERSE DISCRIMINATION. THE LEGALITY AND THE LIMITS OF THE SO-CALLED
DISCRIMINATION A REBOURS UNDER EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 47-49 (1995); ARMIN JUNGBLUTH, DAS
NIEDERLASSUNGSRECHT DER RUNDFUNKVERANSTALTER IN DER
EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT [THE FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT OF
BROADCASTING COMPANIES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY], 126-27 (1991);
KLAUS LACKHOFF, DIE NIEDERLASSUNGSFREIHEIT DES EGV- NUR EIN
GLEICHHEITS- ODER AUCH EIN FREIHEITSRECHT [THE FREEDOM OF
ESTABLISHMENT IN THE EC-ONLY A PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION OR ALSO
A PROHIBITION OF NON-DISCRIMINATORY OBSTACLES] 442 (2000); SCHNICHELS,
supra note 31, at 140-41; Dieter Blumenwitz, Rechtsprobleme im Zusammenhang
mit der Angleichung von Rechtsvorschriften auf dem Gebiet der
Niederlassungsfreiheit der freien Berufe [Legal Problems Regarding the
Harmonization of Rules in the Field of the Freedom of Establishment for
Professional Occupations], NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 621, 622 (1989)
(arguing that liberties protected by the community law are fundamental
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To begin with, the Court has never endorsed the above-described
distinction between different categories of rules, but instead the
Court has repeatedly stated that "national measures liable to
hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental
freedoms" need to be justified."° If the Court had wanted to refer
only to certain kinds of national measures, it could easily have
made this clear. Moreover, at least one of the Court's judgments
regarding non-discriminatory obstacles to the freedom of
establishment concerned a rule regulating the manner in which a
business is operated rather than the access to a profession or the
entry into the territory of another Member State."m In Pfeiffer
Grosshandel, the Court examined the legality of a restraining order
made pursuant to a national statute which prevented an Austrian
subsidiary of a German parent operating discount stores in Austria
from using the trade name "Plus."'" The Court considered this
restraining order to render the exercise of the freedom of
establishment less attractive and concluded that it needed to be
justified."' It seems appropriate, therefore, to take the Court
literally and consider all those national measures that render the
exercise of this Freedom less attractive to restrict the freedom of
establishment. It is obvious the German system of
codetermination meets this requirement.
freedoms); Gilbert Gornig, Probleme der Niederlassungsfreiheit und
Dienstleistungsfreiheit fllrRechtsanwdlte in den Europaischen Gemeinschaften
[Problems Regarding the Freedom of Establishment and the Freedom to Provide
Services of Lawyers in the European Communities], 42 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1120, 1121 (1989) (discussing that liberties protected by
the community law are fundamental freedoms).
107. Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e
Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 37; Case C-19/92, Kraus v. Land
Baden-Wuirttemberg, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1663, $ 35 (holding the protection of the
public is a legitimate justification for administrative authorization of academic
titles); see also Case T-266/97, Vlaamse Televesie Maatschapij NV v.
Commission, 1999 E.C.R. 11-2329, $1 113 (reaffirming the prohibition on national
measures that are "liable to hamper or to render less attractive the exercise by
Community nationals of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty.")
108. Case 225/97, Pfeiffer Grol3handel GmbH v. Lowa Warenhandel GmbH,
1990 E.C.R. 1-2835.
109. See id.
110. See id. $1 20.
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IV. THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE GERMAN SYSTEM OF
CODETERMINATION
It has been argued above that the German system of
codetermination, if applied to pseudo-foreign corporations,
restricts the freedom of establishment."' The question, therefore,
is whether this restriction can be justified. A restriction on the
freedom of establishment can be justified in basically three
different ways. The relevant national measure may be a legitimate
attempt by a Member State to prevent its own nationals from
circumventing national law."' Moreover, the measure can fall
under the explicit exception contained in Article 43(1) of the EC
Treaty."' Finally it can be based on the so-called imperative
111. See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
112. The right of Member States to prevent the circumvention of their
national legislation is not usually mentioned as a justification for measures that
restrict the freedom of establishment. See, e.g., P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN
VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNITIES
739-41 (3d ed. 1998). The reason is that this doctrine was originally understood
to limit the scope of application of the fundamental freedoms rather than to
represent justification for restrictions. See the summary of the circumvention
doctrine in the Opinion of Advocate General Lenz in Case C-23/93, TV10 SA v.
Commissariaat voor de Media, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4795, 25 (stressing the ambiguity
of existing case law). Only the Court's decision in TVIO SA made it clear that
even nationals who try to circumvent national legislation do not fall outside of
the scope of application of establishment. See id. 12-16. Given that the Court
nevertheless upheld the circumvention doctrine, id. 20-21, the only remaining
option is to view the circumvention doctrine as a possible justification for
national measures restricting the freedom of establishment; see also Kom &
Thaler, supra note 23, at 249 (arguing that in the Centros-decision the European
Court of Justice treats the circumvention doctrine as a possible justification for
the behavior of the Danish authorities rather than as a factor determining the
scope of application of Article 43 of the EC Treaty).
113. Article 43 of the EC Treatyseems to focus on natural persons rather than
on corporations. EC Treaty, supra note 16, art. 43(1)(1). However, Article 48 of
the EC refers to Article 43 of the EC as one of the provisions that are to be
applied to corporations. See EC Treaty, supra note 16, art. 48. Hence, there is
general agreement that the freedom of establishment of corporations can be
restricted on the basis of Article 43 of the EC Treaty. See, e.g., Case 79/85, Segers
v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor Bank-en Verzekeringswezen,
Groothandel en Vrije Beroepen, 1986 E.C.R. 1-2375, 12 (stating that companies
within Article 48 are treated under the same conditions as those for nationals
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requirements doctrine developed by the Court."'
A. Preventing the Circumvention of National Legislation
It is reasonable to assume that a considerable number of
corporations conducting all or most of their business in Germany
will try to make use of Centros with the explicit purpose of
avoiding the German law of codetermination.15 This provokes the
question of whether such conduct gives Germany the right to
prevent the circumvention of its law.
It is a well-settled principle of European Community law that
the citizens of a particular Member State cannot invoke the
fundamental freedoms against their own country unless the case
involves some form of cross-border activity.16 For example, a
under Article 43); LACKHOFF, supra note 106, at 449; SCHNICHELS, supra note 31,
at 98.
114. For cases that set out the imperative requirements doctrine, see Case C-
212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, 34;
Case C-19/92, Kraus v. Land Baden-Wfirttemberg, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1663, 32; Case
C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di
Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 37. See, e.g., Case 120/78, REWE-Zentral AG v.
Bundesmonopolverwaltung fUr Brantwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649, [1979] 16 C.M.L.R.
494 (1979) (developing the mandatory (or imperative) requirements doctrine in
this so-called Cassis de Dijon decision with regard to the free movement of
goods). The Court soon began to use a similar reasoning with regard to the
freedom of establishment. However, the Court originally avoided the expression
imperative requirements, using similar terms instead. See, e.g., Case C-250/95,
Futura Participations SA et al. v. Administration des Contributeurs, 1997 E.C.R.
1-2471, 72 (overriding requirement of general interest); Case 71/76, Thieffry v.
Conseil de l'ordre des avocats A la Cour de Paris, 1977 E.C.R. 765, 12
("justified by the general good"); Case 106/91, Ramrath v. Ministre de la Justice,
1992 E.C.R. 1-3351, % 31("justified in the general interest").
115. But see Ulmer, supra note 23, at 663 (arguing that it is difficult to believe
that shareholders intending to form a corporation governed by the law of
codetermination would choose an imaginative business seat in one of the
member states of the European Union where the doctrine of formation applies).
116. See, e.g., Case C-134/95, USSL v. INAIL, 1997 E.C.R 1-195, 19-23
(stating that Article 48, 52 and 59 of the EC Treaty do not apply to activities
confined within a single Member State); Case C-370/90, R v. IAT Surinder Singh
ex parte Secretary for The Home Department, 1992 E.C.R. 1-4265, % 23, 3
C.M.L.R 358 (1992) (stating "when a community national who has availed
himself or herself of the rights [of movement and establishment] returns to his or
2003]
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German manufacturer selling her products in Germany cannot
claim that German rules on product labeling restrict her freedom
of establishment. Therefore, nationals of Member States with
unattractive rules have often tried to create cross-border situations
artificially. For example, in Leclerc v. Au bl vert, a French
company exported and then re-imported books in order to be able
to invoke the free movement of goods (Article 23 EC Treaty)'17
and thereby escape a French law that prohibited retailers from'
selling books at a price more than five percent below the price set
by their publishers. "' So far, such attempts have had little success.
In a series of decisions, the Court has established the principle that
a Member State is entitled to take measures designed to prevent its
nationals from attempting to circumvent their national legislation
"under cover of the rights created by the Treaty. 1.9 In TV10 SA v.
her country of origin, his or her spouse must enjoy at least the same rights of
entry and residence as would be granted to him or her under Community law if
his or her spouse chose to enter and reside in another Member State."); Case
61/91, Cases 35 & 36/82, Morson & Jhanjan v. Netherlands, 1982 E.C.R. 3723,
18, 20 C.M.L.R. 221 (1983) (stating "a member state [may refuse] to allow a
relative.., of a worker employed within the territory of that state who has never
exercised the right to freedom of movement with the community to enter or
reside within its territory if that worker has the nationality of that state and the
relative the nationality of a non-member country."); see also CHALMERS &
SZYSZCZAK, supra note 84, at 286-89 (discussing the distinctions in regulating
domestic products and those that are part of cross-border activity); SCHNICHELS,
supra note 31, at 125; GILLIAN MOORE, The Principle of Equal Treatment, in
THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW (Paul Craig & Grdiinne de Birca eds., 1998).
117. EC Treaty, supra note 16, art. 23.
118. Case 229/83, Leclerc v. Au bld vert, 1985 E.C.R. 1, [1985] 22 C.M.L.R.
286 (1985).
119. Centros Ltd., 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, 24. See Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen v.
Bedrijfsvereniging Metaalnijverheid, 1974 E.C.R. 1299, % 13; Case C-148/91,
Veronica Omroep Organisatie v. Commissariaat voor de Media, 1993 E.C.R. I-
487, 12 (reaffirming a Member State's right to prevent "the exercise by a
person whose activity is entirely or principally directed towards its territory of the
freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty for the purpose of avoiding the professional
rules of conduct which would be applicable to him if he were established within
that State."); Case C-23/93, TV10 SA v. Commissariaat voor de Media, 1994
E.C.R. 1-4795, 21 (affirming a Member State "may regard as a domestic
broadcaster a radio and television organization which establishes itself in
another Member State in order to provide services there which are intended for
the first State's territory" since the aim of the measure is to prevent organizations
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Commissariaat voor de Media, a decision concerning the freedom
to provide services (Article 49 EC Treaty),'20 the Court has
expressed this circumvention doctrine as follows:
A Member State cannot be denied the right to take measures to
prevent the exercise by a person providing services whose
activity is entirely or principally directed towards its territory of
the freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty for the purpose of
avoiding the rules which would be applicable to him if he were
established within that State.'2'
Against this background, it would not have been surprising
had the Court allowed the Danish government to invoke the
circumvention doctrine in Centros2 2 After all, the very purpose of
pseudo-foreign corporations such as Centros Ltd is to avoid the
corporate law of the Member State in the territory of which the
corporation is to conduct most of its activities. Yet in Centros, the
Court explicitly refused to apply the circumvention doctrine. '
The Court stressed that:
[TIhe provisions of national law, application of which the
parties concerned have sought to avoid, are rules governing the
formation of companies and not rules concerning the carrying
on of certain trades, professions or businesses .... The fact that
a national of a Member State who wishes to set up a company
which establish themselves in another Member State from being able to
wrongfully avoid obligations under national laws); Case 229/83, Leclerc v. Au ble
vert, 1985 E.C.R. 1, 27 (affirming a Member State may take certain measures to
prevent circumvention of national legislation).
120. EC Treaty, supra note 16, art. 49.
121. TVIO SA, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4795, 20.
122. But see Steindorff, supra note 23, at 1140-41. Steindorff considers it
unsurprising that the Court allowed Centros Ltd. to invoke the freedom of
establishment despite its attempt to avoid Danish corporate law. This is certainly
true, given that the circumvention doctrine concerns the level of justification
rather than the scope of application of the fundamental freedoms. See supra note
112. However, Steindorff makes no attempt to explain why the Court does not
allow Denmark to invoke the doctrine on the level of justification. Cf. also
TROBERG, supra note 87, at 1343, 67 (arguing that so-called letter box
companies should be excluded from the scope of application of Article 43 EC).
123. Cf. Centros Ltd., 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, 26, 27 (discussing the
circumvention doctrine).
2003]
636 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VIII
FINANCIAL LAW
chooses to form it in the Member State whose rules of company
law seem to him the least restrictive and to set up branches in
other Member States cannot, in itself, constitute an abuse of the
right of establishment.124
In other words, the Court seems to uphold the circumvention
doctrine while at the same time limiting its scope of application.
Forming a pseudo-foreign company under the less restrictive law of
another Member State does not trigger the circumvention
doctrine;" avoiding rules concerning the carrying on of certain
trades, professions or businesses does.'26
The problem with this distinction lies in its vagueness. This
becomes particularly apparent with regard to the rules governing
codetermination. While codetermination rules determine the
structure of the supervisory board and therefore concern the
internal structure of a corporation, 27 they are not, strictly speaking,
"rules governing the formation of companies."'" Even assuming,
however, that one interprets the term "formation" broadly to
include all of corporate law, the legal fate of codetermination
would still be uncertain. After all, a rule may concern both the
formation of a company and the carrying on of a certain trade,
profession or business. For example, the Coal and Steel
Codetermination Act applies only to firms in the coal, iron and
steel industries.
29
In light of the above, it is clear that the line drawn by the
Court between "rules governing the formation of companies" and
"rules concerning the carrying on of trades, professions and
businesses" needs to be clarified further. In the following, it is




127. For a definition of the notion "internal affairs" cf., e.g., Matthias Korner,
Das Kollisionsrecht der Kapitalgesellschaften in den Vereinigten Staaten von
Amerika [The Law Governing Conflicts of Law with Regard to Corporations in
the United States of America] 90-128 (1989).
128. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 77-109
(5th ed. 2000) (using the expression "formation of corporations" to describe the
process by which corporations are incorporated).
129. See Coal and Steel Codetermination Act, supra note 55, § 1(2).
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guidance for undertaking this clarification.' °  However, it is
submitted that irrespective of the nature of the rule to be avoided,
the formation of a pseudo-foreign corporation should not trigger
the application of the circumvention doctrine. 31
1. The Centros decision
In order to infer the exact scope of the circumvention doctrine
from the Centros decision, one can essentially choose between two
different options. The first is to argue that in referring to "rules
concerning the formation of companies" the Court really intended
to create a safe haven for all of corporate law. The second option
is to argue that the expression "rules governing the carrying on of
certain trades, professions, or businesses" only refers to the narrow
field of rules relating to professional conduct, thereby excluding
rules that govern the internal affairs of corporations. However,
neither of these two options is particularly convincing.
i. Rules Governing the Formation of Companies
There is little reason to believe that the Court, in referring to
"rules governing the formation of companies," meant to refer to all
rules pertaining to the internal affairs of corporations. The
expression "formation of companies" is used several times in the
Court's reasoning, "3 which strongly suggests that the Court
purposefully chose this terminology. Moreover, to discount the
Court's terminology as accidental would only be justified if no
plausible reason existed for the distinction between rules governing
the formation of companies and other corporate law rules.
130. See discussion infra Part II.
131. See discussion infra Part II.
132- See, e.g., EDDY WYMEERSCH, Centros: A Landmark Decision in
European Company Law, in CORPORATIONS, CAPITAL MARKETS AND BUSINESS
IN THE LAW. LIBER AMICORUM RICHARD M. BUXBAUM 629, 637 (Theodor
Baums et al. eds., 1999) (giving examples referring to professional conduct such
as "requirements regarding the qualification and reliability of persons intending
to work in a certain business.").
133. See Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999
E.C.R. 1-1459, IT 26, 36, 39.
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However, while such a distinction may not make much sense from
an economic perspective, it can plausibly be explained on a
doctrinal level.
Article 48 of the EC Treaty explicitly provides that
corporations "formed in accordance with the law of a Member
State" enjoy the freedom of establishment.14 In other words, in
order for a company to be protected by Article 43(1) of the EC
Treaty, it is sufficient that the company is validly formed under any
one Member State's law. 135 This necessarily implies that whatever
restrictions other Member States are allowed to impose on foreign
corporations, they cannot change the fact that the organization in
question is a corporation in its state of incorporation and can
therefore invoke Article 43 of the EC Treaty.'36 In this sense, other
Member States are indirectly bound by the rules of the state of
incorporation governing the formation of companies. It is a small
step to conclude that the rules governing the formation of
companies enjoy a special status vis-a-vis other corporate law rules.
Hence, the fact that the Court exempted rules governing the
formation of companies from the circumvention doctrine does not
necessarily imply that the Court will extend this safe haven to other
corporate law rules.
ii. Rules Concerning the Carrying on of Certain Trades
As mentioned above, one could also try to argue that the
Centros decision has limited the circumvention doctrine to rules
governing professional conduct.'37  Such rules would include
regulations dealing with the necessary qualification of service
providers or with behavioral standards vis-A-vis clients. With the
circumvention doctrine limited in such a way, "rules governing the
formation of companies" would only be one example of rules to
134. EC Treaty, supra note 16, art. 48.
135. EC Treaty, supra note 16, art. 43(1)(1). See, e.g., SCHNICHELS, supra note
31, at 55; TROBERG, supra note 87, at 1425; Forsthoff, supra note 23, at 174.
136. But see Kindler, supra note 34, at 1997 (arguing that the law of the host
state-including the host state's conflict of law rules-determines whether or not
the foreign corporation has been validly founded and therefore enjoys the
protection of Article 52 EC).
137. See, e.g., WYMEERSCH, supra note 132, at 8.
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which the circumvention doctrine does not apply.18  Given that
codetermination rules go far beyond regulating the professional
conduct of a corporation, they would not fall under the
circumvention doctrine either.
However, there is little to suggest such a reading of the
Centros decision. The Court has not stated that it wishes to limit
the circumvention doctrine to "rules concerning the carrying on of
certain trades, professions, or businesses," 139 but has simply
juxtaposed those rules with "rules governing the formation of
companies." "", Therefore, the decision's wording leaves open the
question of whether "rules concerning the carrying on of certain..
. businesses" are the only field of application of the circumvention
doctrine, or whether they are only one example of rules to which
the doctrine applies.'4' Moreover, to limit the circumvention
doctrine's scope of application to "rules concerning the carrying on
of certain trades, professions, or businesses" would amount to a
radical departure from the Court's prior case law. In earlier
decisions, the Court had formulated the circumvention doctrine in
very general terms.' 2 The Court has also applied the doctrine to
rules governing the internal affairs of corporations. A striking
example is the Court's TV1O SA decision. ' There, a broadcasting
firm had established itself in Luxembourg in order to circumvent
the requirements that the Dutch Media Law ("Mediawet")
imposed on broadcasting companies.'" Article 31 of the Mediawet
prescribed that airtime for radio and television programs on the
national network could only be allocated to so-called broadcasting




142. For examples of the court defining the circumvention in general terms,
see Case C-23/93, TV10 SA v. Commissariaat voor de Media, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4795,
21; Case C-148/91, Veronica Omroep Organisatie v. Commissariaat voor de
Media, 1991 E.C.R. 1-487, 12; Case 205/84, Commission v. Germany, 1986
E.C.R. 3755, 22, [1987] 24 C.M.L.R. 69 (1987); Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen v.
Bedrifsvereniging Metaalnijverheid, 1974 E.C.R. 1307, 13, [1975] 12 C.M.L.R.
69 (1975) 13.
143. See TV1O SA, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4795.
144. Id.
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associations.' Article 14 of the Mediawet defined broadcasting
associations as associations of listeners or viewers having legal
personality, established to represent a particular social, cultural,
religious or philosophical persuasion set out in their statutes.14 6
While the provisions in question did not contain typical corporate
law rules, they clearly regulated the internal affairs of the
organizations in question by imposing restrictions regarding both
the organizations' membership (viewers/listeners) and their
purpose (non-commercial). Nevertheless, the Court applied the
circumvention doctrine, allowing the Netherlands to deny access to
its network to the Luxembourg corporation.147 Moreover, the
Court formulated the circumvention doctrine in very general
terms, referring to "rules which would be applicable to [the person]
if he were established within that State."'48 Therefore, if the
Centros decision had been intended to limit the circumvention
doctrine to rules of a certain type, one could have expected a clear
statement to that effect.
In addition, it should not go unmentioned that to limit the
circumvention doctrine to "rules concerning the carrying on of
certain trades, professions or businesses" would lead to
considerable doctrinal problems. 9 What distinguishes such rules
from other national legislation in such a way as to justify a
difference in treatment? Admittedly, the Court, renowned for its
apodictic reasoning,"' does not always justify its decisions in a
satisfactory manner. Nevertheless, the fact that a particular
position is hard or impossible to defend on a doctrinal level hardly
makes it more likely that the position in question is the one that
the Court had in mind when choosing an ambiguous wording.
Finally, even if the Centros decision were to be interpreted as
limiting the circumvention doctrine to "rules concerning the
carrying on of certain trades, professions or businesses," this would
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See id. 20-22.
148. Id. T 20.
149. See Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999
E.C.R. 1-1459, 1 26.
150. Cf. WYATT, supra note 84, at 201 (pointing out that the Court often cites
earlier decisions only if they support its argument).
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not allow the conclusion that only rules governing professional
conduct fall under the circumvention doctrine. After all, the term
"carrying on of certain trades, professions, or businesses" suggests
a much broader understanding.
In summary, it is not particularly plausible to interpret the
Centros decision as stating that the circumvention doctrine shall
only apply to rules governing professional conduct.
2. Carving an Exemption from the Circumvention Doctrine
As explained above, the Centros decision does not provide any
guidance in defining the exact scope of application of the
circumvention doctrine.' The challenge, therefore, is to clarify the
scope of the circumvention doctrine as it relates to the German
system of codetermination in a way that is not only consistent with
the Court's holding in Centros, but also doctrinally defensible.
In my view, the simplest and doctrinally most convincing
option is to focus on the distinction between the corporation and
its shareholders/incorporators. The circumvention doctrine is
based on the idea that citizens should not be allowed to make use
of the fundamental freedoms with the sole purpose of evading the
national legislation of their own Member States. 52 One may argue
151. See Centros Ltd., 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, 27.
152. See, e.g., Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen v. Bedrijfsvereniging voor de
Metaalnijverheid, 1974 E.C.R. 1299, 13 (holding, in relation to Article 59, that a
Member State "cannot be denied the right to take measures to [prevent] the
exercise of a person whose activity is entirely or principally directed towards its
territory of the freedom guaranteed by the Treaty for the purpose of avoiding the
professional rules of conduct which would be applicable to him if he were
established within that State."); Case C-148/91, Veronica Omroep Organisatie v.
Commissariaat voor de Media, 1993 E.C.R. 1-487, 12 (citing the same passage
from the Van Binsbergen case); Case C-23/93, TV10 SA v. Commissariaat voor
de Media, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4795, $ 21 (holding that "a Member State may regard as
a domestic broadcaster a radio and television organization which establishes itself
in another Member State in order to provide services there which are intended
for the first State's territory, since the aim of that measure is to prevent
organizations which establish themselves in another Member State from being
able, by exercising the freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, wrongfully to avoid
obligations under national law."); Case 229/83, Leclerc v. Au ble vert, 1985
E.C.R. 1, 27 (holding that a Member State could restrict freedom of movement
2003]
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that this rationale also applies in cases where a pseudo-foreign
corporation is formed in order to circumvent the national
legislation of the Member State where the corporation's real seat is
located. However, the decisive question is whether the doctrine
can legitimately be directed against the pseudo-foreign corporation
itself as opposed to its incorporators or shareholders. Article 48 of
the EC Treaty explicitly extends the freedom of establishment to
corporations53 and thereby recognizes the corporation as a
separate legal entity. This implies that a corporation cannot be
accused of circumventing national law, simply because its
shareholders and/or incorporators have done so.
At first glance, this solution may seem artificial. However, to
deny the corporation the freedom of establishment on the grounds
that its founders or shareholders have circumvented their national
legislation would amount to a case of reverse veil piercing. In the
field of corporate law, such reverse veil piercing is generally and
sensibly considered to be permissible only in rare and exceptional
cases. 54  Allowing such veil piercing in the field of European
Community law would render the guarantee contained in Article
48 of the EC Treaty superfluous. If the freedom of establishment
of corporations had been intended to depend on that of the
of goods where the goods were "exported for the sole purpose of re-importation
in order to circumvent legislation of the type at issue.").
153. EC Treaty, supra note 16, art. 48.
154. See Stoebner v. Lingenfelter, 115 F.3d 576, 580 n.4 (8th Cir. 1997)
(applying Minnesota law which recognizes reverse pierce of the corporate veil
when "no shareholder or creditor would be adversely affected."); Flight Serv.
Group, Inc. v. Patten Corp., 963 F. Supp. 158, 160 (D. Conn. 1997) (holding that
"the corporate veil can be pierced.., to impose liability on the owner of an
offending corporation" and rejecting argument by defendant for reverse pierce of
the corporate veil where defendant sought "imposition of liability on a
corporation based on its shareholder's liability."). But see Michael J. Gaertner,
Note, Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should Corporation Owners Have It
Both Ways?, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 667, 696-704 (1989) (adopting a "flexible
definition of the corporate entity" and proposing "unitary interest test" as a more
generous approach towards reverse veil piercing). For examples in German law,
see HOLGER ALTMEPPEN & GONTHER ROTH, GESETZ BETREFFEND DIE
GESELLSCHAFTEN MIT BESCHRANKTER HAFTUNG (GMBH) [LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY (GMBH) AcT] 146-47, § 13 28-32 (3d ed. 1997), referring to
individual cases decided by the German judiciary.
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corporations' incorporators or shareholders, one could have
omitted Article 48 of the EC Treaty and instead derived the
protection of corporations from the freedom of establishment of
their incorporators or shareholders.
Moreover, it should be kept in mind that in other cases a
corporation's freedom of establishment is not limited either by the
extent to which its shareholders and incorporators enjoy that
Freedom. For example, if U.S. citizens form a corporation under
German law, the corporation is protected by Article 43 of the EC
Treaty, even though its founders (and first shareholders) are not."'5
Why then, should one deny the protection of Article 43 of the EC
Treaty to a corporation, simply because the corporation's
shareholders or incorporators have sought to avoid their Member
State's legislation and therefore cannot claim to be violated in their
freedom of establishment?
Admittedly, the suggested approach is not completely in line
with the case law of the Court. In the already cited TVIO SA
decision, the Court applied the circumvention doctrine to a
Luxembourg corporation that had been formed by Dutch nationals
in order to circumvent their national legislation. 6 However, the
case could have been decided the same way without recourse to the
circumvention doctrine. The Court could simply have pointed out
that cultural pluralism is an imperative requirement that justifies
restricting the fundamental freedoms."7 Moreover, in TV1O SA the
155. See, e.g., ULRICH EVERLING, DAs NIEDERLASSUNGSRECr IM
GEMEINSAMEN MARKT [THE FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT IN THE COMMON
MARKET] 40 (1990); SCHNICHELS, supra note 31, at 59-60; TROBERG, supra note
87, 1$ 5, 32. But see Albert Bleckmann, Zur Dogmatik der Niederlassungsfreiheit
im EWG-Vertrag [The Dogmatics of the Freedom of Establishment], WIRTSCHAFr
UND VERWALTUNG [WUVI 119, 120 (1987) (arguing that the freedom of
establishment should only apply to those corporations that have at least one
shareholder who is protected by Article 43 of the EC Treaty).
156. See Case C-23/93, TV10 SA v. Commissariaat voor de Media, 1994
E.C.R. 1-4795, 2, 20-22.
157. Cf., e.g., Joined Cases 60 and 61/84, Cinrth~que SA v. Fdrration
nationale des cin6mas francais, 1985 E.C.R. 2605, T$ 15, 23 (holding that
protection of the cinema as a means of cultural expression is necessary and that a
national system which seeks to "encourage the creation of cinematographic
works irrespective of their origin" by giving such works priority in distribution
through the cinema is justified).
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Court may simply have overlooked the issue. The case was
referred to the Court by a Dutch Court according to Article 234 of
the EC Treaty. "8 Under Article 234 of the EC Treaty, the national
courts are competent both to find the facts and to apply the law.'59
The Court only has to decide on the correct interpretation of
European Community law.6° In TVJO SA, the Dutch Court,
referring the case to the Court for a preliminary ruling, had found
that the relevant corporation had "established itself in
Luxembourg."'' 1 Obviously, a corporation cannot form itself, and
consequently it cannot "establish itself" unless it has already been
formed. However, the terminology used by the Dutch Court is
nicely suited to avoid having to address the problem of reverse veil
piercing. The Court may simply have copied that terminology and
hence the referring court's flawed reasoning without giving the
issue any thought.
In sum, the application of the German codetermination
statutes to pseudo-foreign corporations cannot be justified on the
grounds that the corporations' incorporators intended to avoid
German corporate law.
B. Article 46(1) of the EC
According to Article 46(1) of the EC Treaty, the freedom of
establishment does "not prejudice the applicability of provisions
158. See TVJO SA, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4795, 1.
159. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-332/92, C-333/92 and C-335/92, Eurico Italia Srl
v. Ente Nazionale Risi, 1994 E.C.R. 1-711, 17, [1994] 31 C.M.L.R. 580 (1994)
("[I]t is solely for the national courts before which actions are brought, and which
must bear the responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in
the light of the special features of each case both the need for a preliminary
ruling in order to enable them to deliver judgment and the relevance of the
questions which they submit to the Court."); see also WYATt, supra note 84, at
269 (discussing "application of law to the facts or the compatibility of national
with the requirements of Community law.., are matters within exclusive
jurisdiction of the national court in proceedings under Article 234.").
160. Article 234 of the Consolidated EC Treaty provides that "[t]he Court of
Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the
interpretation of this Treaty. . . ." Cf. WYATr, supra note 84, at 273 (stating the
Court has jurisdiction to rule on the interpretation of the treaty).
161. See TVIO SA, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4795, 9.
THE FUTURE OF CODETERMINA TION
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action providing for
special treatment of foreign nationals on grounds of public policy,
public security or public health., 162 These concepts are specified to
some extent in Directive 64/221,163 without, however, being given
an exhaustive definition."
With regard to codetermination, both public security and
public health must obviously be discarded as possible grounds of
justification. In particular, any positive effects that
codetermination may have on the health of employees are far too
indirect and speculative to support the application of the public
health exception.
This leaves the public policy exception. According to the
Court, the reliance by a public authority upon the concept of public
policy presupposes the existence of a "genuine and sufficiently
serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of
society. '' 16 This leads to the question of what the goals of the
codetermination statutes are. In this context, it is helpful to
consider the legislative history of the Codetermination Act. The
relevant legislative materials refer to the public debate on
codetermination, and without actually endorsing the relevant
arguments, list four considerations that are used to justify
codetermination. 16 These considerations include the protection of
162. EC Treaty, supra note 16, art. 46.
163. 1963-1964 O.J. SPEC, ED, 117. The directive is based on Article 46(1) of
the Consolidated EC Treaty.
164. See, e.g., LACKHOFF, supra note 106, at 451; TROBERT, supra note 87, at
1392 9; WYATT, supra note 84, at 417-21 (discussing the lack of practicality in
compiling "a list of diseases and disabilities which might endanger public health,
public policy or public security, and that it is sufficient to classify such diseases
and disabilities in groups.").
165. Case 30/77, R v. Bouchereau, 1977 E.C.R. 1999, [1977] C.M.L.R. 800
(1977). Bouchereau concerned the free movement of workers, but it is generally
assumed that the same standard has to apply with regard to the other
fundamental freedoms. See, e.g., LAWRENCE GORMLEY, PROHIBITING
RESTRICrIONS ON TRADE WITHIN THE ECC 129 (1985) (discussing the idea of a
genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the requirements of public policy
affecting one of the fundamental interests in society as developed in the context
of persons is helpful in classifying restrictions or prohibitions on trade in goods).
166. Regarding the legislative history of the Codetermination Act from 1976,
the official statement of reasons accompanying the government's bill is
2003]
646 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VIII
FINANCIAL LAW
human dignity,'67 the necessity to grant equal rights to the providers
of capital and labor,'68 the realization of the principle of
democracy,' 69 and the necessity to limit corporate power in
general.'7°  All of these considerations might somehow be
categorized as concerning fundamental interests of society.
However, in order for Article 46 of the EC Treaty to apply, there
must also be a "genuine and sufficiently serious threat" to one or
more of the interests in question. 7' In the case at hand, this
requirement is not met. 2 The Court has pointed out that while
European Community ("Community") law does not impose upon
the Member States a uniform scale of values, a particular state of
affairs cannot be considered a serious threat if the relevant
Member State tolerates the same state of affairs in other
contexts.'" A variety of legal entities that can own and operate an
enterprise, e.g. partnerships, do not fall under the various
comparatively silent on the question of the goals of codetermination. It only
states that the statute aims at bringing about a situation in which shareholders
and employees participate with equal rights and equal influence in the decision-
making process in enterprises. See Drucksache des Bundestages (BT-Drs.)
7/2172, 16, 17. However, the statute had been prepared by a committee of
experts appointed by the government, namely the so-called
"SachverstAndigenkommission zur Auswertung der bisherigen Erfahrungen bei
der Mitbestimmung" ("Committee of Experts for the Evaluation of Past
Experiences with Codetermination"). The resulting committee report
summarizes the discussion on codetermination and, in particular, names the
factors that are suggested as being the goals of codetermination. See Drucksache
des Bundestages [BT-Drs.] VI/334, 18-20. Cf also ZIMMER, supra note 23, at 135.
167. See Drucksache des Bundestages [BT-Drs.] VI/334, 18.
168. See id. at 18-19.
169. See id. at 19-20.
170. See id. at 20-21.
171. See sources cited supra note 85.
172 See Case C-23/93, TV10 SA v. Commissariaat voor de Media, 1994
E.C.R. 1-4795.
173. See, e.g., Joined Cases 115 & 116/81, Adoui v. Belgian State and City of
Liege and Comuaille v. Belgian State, 1982 E.C.R. 1665, [1982] 19 C.M.L.R. 631
(1982) (arguing that the conduct of a foreign citizen may not be considered as
being of sufficiently serious nature to justify restrictions on the admission to or
residence within the territory of a Member State if the Member State in question
does not adopt genuine and effective measures to combat such conduct with
respect to the same conduct on the part of its own nationals).
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codetermination statutes. 174 Given that Germany tolerates the
absence of codetermination in such companies, it is implausible to
argue that the lack of codetermination in pseudo-foreign
companies is a sufficiently serious threat to the interests mentioned
above. Article 46(1) of the EC, therefore, cannot serve as a basis
for justifying the application of the German codetermination
statutes to pseudo-foreign corporations.
C. The Imperative Requirements Doctrine
Under the case law of the Court, national measures restricting
the freedom of establishment can also be justified under the so-
called "imperative" or "mandatory" requirements doctrine. 7 ' In
order for this doctrine to apply, the national measure in question
must meet five requirements: it must be applied in a non-
discriminatory manner; it must be justified by imperative
requirements in the general interest; it must be suitable for
securing the attainment of the objective that it pursues; and it must
not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.'76 Finally, the
burden imposed by the measure in question must not be
disproportionate when compared to the benefits that the measure
174. See supra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
175. See sources cited supra note 114.
176. See, e.g., Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Awocati e
Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 36-37 (participating in a specific
activity of a national of a Member State in another Member State is subject to
conditions of the host Member State, those conditions must fulfill these
requirements where they are liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise
of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty). In Centros, the Court did
not consider these conditions to be fulfilled, providing two reasons in support of
this conclusion. See Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og
Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459. First, imposing the minimum capital
requirement on "pseudo-foreign companies such as Centros is not such as to
attain the objective of protecting creditors" because no such requirement is
imposed on companies having their real seat in the United Kingdom and
conducting business in Denmark. Id. Second, the minimum capital requirement
goes beyond what is necessary: the corporation's creditors are on notice that the
corporation is formed under the law of another Member State. Id. Moreover,
Denmark could have protected creditors in a manner that restricts the freedom
of establishment less by, for example, making it possible in law for public
creditors to obtain the necessary guarantees. Id.
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produces.'77
1. The Existence of an Imperative Requirement in the Case of
Codetermination
The first task in applying the above-described doctrine to the
context at hand is to determine whether the German system of
codetermination serves any imperative requirements.
In this context, several issues need to be considered. For the
purpose of simplicity, it is helpful to first address a view in the legal
literature according to which codetermination cannot possibly
serve any imperative requirements, because codetermination lacks
a "community dimension."'78  As shown below, this view is
unconvincing."9
This leads back to the main problem, namely how to define the
imperative requirements that Germany will be able to invoke in
defending its system of codetermination. This task comprises two
aspects. One is the need to identify the legislative goals that the
Court is likely to recognize as imperative requirements.' The
other is predicting the amount of discretion that the Court will
grant the Member States, in this case Germany, in specifying these
requirements.'8
177. See, e.g., Case C-470/93, Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe
K61n e.V. v. Mars GmbH, 1995 E.C.R. 1-1923, 15 (noting it is settled law that
obstacles to intra-Community trade resulting from disparities between provisions
of national law must be accepted in so far as such provisions may be justified as
being necessary in order to satisfy overriding requirements relating, inter alia, to
consumer protection and fair trading but, such provisions must be proportionate
to the objective pursued and that objective must be incapable of being achieved
by measures which are less restrictive of intra-Community trade). Case C-19/92,
Kraus v. Land Baden-Wtirttemberg, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1663, 42 (interpreting
Articles 48 and 52 of the Treaty to mean that the benefits of an authorization
procedure for a national who holds a postgraduate academic title awarded in
another Member State to use the title on its territory are not disproportionate for
the penalties proscribed for non-compliance with the procedure).
178. See Hammen, supra note 23, at 2494-95.
179. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
180. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
181. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
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i. The Need for a "Community Dimension"
According to a view recently expressed by Hammen, there can
be no imperative requirement justifying codetermination law,
because codetermination lacks what he calls a "community
dimension." '182 Hammen's reasoning can be summed up as follows:
fundamental freedoms are supposed to restrain the Member States.
Therefore, it cannot be left to the Member States to freely define
the imperative requirements that justify restricting those
freedoms. 3 It follows that an objective can only be classified as an
imperative requirement, if it has a "community dimension.""
Codetermination lacks such a community dimension.85 Article
137(3)(3) of the EC Treaty explicitly allows the European
Community to pass legislation regarding codetermination, 18 6 but
the European nations have not made use of this provision."
Moreover, neither the European Social Charter nor the
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers
postulate any right to codetermination"'
It should be noted, first, that Hammen's reasoning has been
rendered obsolete by recent legislative developments. In 2001, the
European Community adopted a directive governing worker
participation in the so-called European Company.89 Thus, it seems
reasonable to argue that codetermination now has a community
dimension. Even aside from this, however, Hammen's line of
182 See Hammen, supra note 23, at 2494-495.
183. See id. at 2494.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. EC Treaty, supra note 16, art. 137(3)(3).
187. See Hammen, supra note 23, at 2495.
188. See id. In my view, it is not clear why Hammen refers to the European
Social Charter ("Europaiische Sozialcharta") at all. The European Social Charter
is not part of European Community or European Union law. Rather, the
European Social Charter was adopted by the Council of Europe, an international
organization that is independent of the European Union. It is possible, however,
that Hammen really means the Community Social Charter that was adopted in
1989.
189. See Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 Supplementing the
Statute for a European Company with Regard to the Involvement of Employees,
2001 O.J. (L 294) 22.
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reasoning is unconvincing. To begin with, black letter law does not
support the thesis that imperative requirements must have a
"community dimension" in the sense described by Hammen. The
Court does not even mention such a "community dimension" in
the context of the imperative requirements doctrine." Moreover,
even though Hammen is right in arguing that the Member States
cannot be completely free in defining imperative requirements, it
does not necessarily follow that the Court should only recognize
those requirements as imperative that are already endorsed by the
Treaty or by secondary Community law. Even without taking
recourse to European Community law, the Court can undertake a
balancing test to determine whether the goals invoked by the
Member States are sufficiently important to be classified as
imperative requirements.
Moreover, Hammen's view, if applied consistently, violates the
principle of subsidiarity expressed in Article 5(2) of the EC
Treaty.'91 According to Article 5(2) of the EC Treaty, the
Community cannot, except in areas where its competence is
exclusive, take action if a certain problem can be dealt with
adequately at the level of the Member States.'92 Following
Hammen's line of reasoning, the Member States cannot pass
legislation restricting the fundamental freedoms, unless the
relevant legislative objective has already been made the object of
Community law.'93 Therefore, if the Member States wish to protect
190. For examples of cases that do not mention a "community dimension" as
part of the imperative requirements doctrine, see Case 8/74, Procureur Roi v.
Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, 14; Case 58/80, Dansk Supermarked A/S v. a/S
Imerco, 1981 E.C.R. 181, 11; Case 6/81, BV Industrie Diensten Groep v. J.A.
Beele Handelmaatschappij BV, 1982 E.C.R. 707, T 7; Case 182/84, Miro BV, 1985
E.C.R. 3731, 16; Case 179/85, Commission v. Germany, 1986 E.C.R. 3879, 11;
Case C-196/89, Nespoli, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3647, 14; Case C-293/93, Straffesag v.
Houtwipper Neeltje, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4249, 1 11.
191. EC Treaty, supra note 16, art. 5(2).
192. EC Treaty, supra note 16, art. 5(2) provides that:
[i]n areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall
take action in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity only if and insofar as
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
193. See Hammen, supra note 23, at 2494.
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values that are not listed in the EC Treaty itself, they have to make
these values the object of secondary Community law, even if these
issues can be dealt with more efficiently at the level of the Member
States."'
Even if Hammen were right in claiming that imperative
requirements must have a "Community dimension," his reasoning
regarding codetermination would still be unconvincing. In
asserting that codetermination lacks a "Community dimension,"
Hammen fails to distinguish between the imperative requirements
that function as legislative meta-goals and the means by which
these meta-goals are pursued. Codetermination may not be an
imperative requirement itself, but it can still constitute a means by
which Member States pursue other goals such as the protection of
workers. Therefore, instead of asking whether codetermination
has a "Community dimension," Hammen should have examined
whether the purposes that are served by codetermination have
such a dimension. This distinction is particularly important,
because the Court has pointed out that the Member States enjoy a
certain freedom of choice in selecting the most appropriate means
to pursue a given imperative requirement. '95 Correspondingly, the
Court has made it clear that a law does not need to exist in more
than one Member State in order to serve an imperative
requirement.196
In summary, the suggestion that codetermination cannot be
justified by imperative requirements for lack of a Community
dimension does not hold.
ii. Identifying Imperative Requirements
The Court has never provided a definition of the term
194. See id. at 2495.
195. See, e.g., Case C-293/93, Straffesag v. Houtwipper Neeltje, 1994 E.C.R. I-
4249, 91 22 (noting that Member States have great discretion in choosing
appropriate measures to deal with trade among Member States).
196. See, e.g., Case C-124/97, Markku Juhani L5ara et al. v. Sweden, 1999
E.C.R. 1-1227, T1 36 (stating "the mere fact that a Member State has opted for a
system of protection which differs from that adopted by another Member State
cannot affect the assessment of the need for, and proportionality of, the
provisions enacted to that end.").
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"imperative requirement."'" Rather, the Court has decided on a
case-by-case basis on which legislative meta-goals are to be
classified as imperative.198 In doing so, the Court has been rather
generous, not hesitating to stretch the common meaning of the
expression "imperative requirement. ' ' l99 For example, the
prevention of unfair commercial practices,2" the effectiveness of
197. See, e.g., KAPTEYN & VAN THEMAAT, supra note 112, at 676 (noting that
the Court will only accept measures justified by non-economic interests, yet it is
still unclear what measures the Court will allow a Member State to implement).
198. See infra notes 200-09 and accompanying text.
199. See infra notes 200-09 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, 6
(discussing that measures to prevent unfair practices should be reasonable and
should not act as a hindrance to trade between Member States); Case 58/80,
Dansk Supermarked A/S v. Imerco, 1981 E.C.R. 181, 17 (stating that "an
agreement involving a prohibition on the importation into a Member State of
goods lawfully marketed in another Member State may not be relied upon or
taken into consideration in order to classify the marketing of such goods as an
improper or unfair commercial practice."); Case 6/81, BV Industrie Diensten
Groep v. J. A. Beele Handelmaatschappij BV, 1982 E.C.R. 707, 7 (stating that
"in the absence of common rules relating to the production and marketing of
products, obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from disparities
between national legislation must be accepted in so far as such legislation,
applying without discrimination to both domestic and imported products, may be
justified as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in
particular to ... fairness in commercial transactions."); see id. 13 (noting that "a
body of case-law prohibiting imitation of someone else's product may not be
regarded as exceeding the scope of the mandatory requirements which.., the
fairness of commercial transactions constitute."); Case 182/84, Miro BV, 1985
E.C.R. 3731, 24 (noting that the Court has held that "interests such as fair
trading must be guaranteed with regard on all sides for the fair and traditional
practices observed in the various Member States."); Case 179/85, Commission v.
Germany, 1986 E.C.R. 3879, 15 (recognizing that the requirements arise "from
the need to have regard on all sides for the fair and traditional practices observed
in the various Member States."); Case C-196/89, Nespoli, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3647,
14 (stating that "such rules are therefore permissible under the Treaty only
if... they.., are intended to satisfy mandatory requirements relating, in
particular .... to fair trading."); Case C-238/89, Pall Corp. v. P.J. Dahlhausen &
Co., 1990 E.C.R. 1-4827, 12 (noting that the Court has "consistently held that
obstacles to intra-Community trade resulting from disparities between the
provisions of national law must be accepted in so far as such provisions... may
be justified as necessary in order to satisfy imperative requirements relating ... to
fair trading."); Case C-293/93, Straffesag v. Houtwipper Neeltje, 1994 E.C.R. I-
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fiscal supervision,20' the protection of consumers22 and the plurality
of the media' 3 have all been accepted by the Court as imperative
4249, 20 (rejecting the argument that "a Member State may not prohibit the
marketing in its territory of articles of precious metal hallmarked by the
producers themselves in the Member State of exportation, where compliance
with the law and... the safeguarding of fair trading are assured by a ranges of
measures.").
201. See, e.g., Case 120/78, REWE-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung
fur Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649, 8 (noting that "obstacles to movement within
the Community" must be accepted if they are created by national provisions that
are "necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating.., to the
effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, fairness of
commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer."); Case 823/79,
Carciati, 1980 E.C.R. 2773, 10 (noting that a prohibition "imposed by a
Member State on persons resident in its territory on the use of vehicles imported
temporarily tax-free" is "an effective way of preventing tax frauds and ensuring
that taxes are paid in the country of destination of the goods."); Case 90/82,
Commission v. France, 1983 E.C.R. 2011, 29 (explaining that conformity with
the provisions of Directive No. 72/464, which is designed to establish general
principles for the harmonization of the system of taxation of tobacco, guarantees
the integrity of the fiscal receipts).
202 See, e.g., Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, 6 (noting that reasonable
measures must be taken to guarantee for consumers the authenticity of a
product's designation of origin); Dansk Supermarked, 1981 E.C.R. 181, 13
(noting that the Danish law at issue is not only comparable to laws of other
Member States against- unfair competition, but it also has a particular objective in
protecting consumers); REWE-Zentral, 1979 E.C.R. 649, 8-9 (noting the
necessity of a Member State's regulation of alcohol production and marketing for
"the protection of public health.., and the defence of the consumer."); Case
130/80, Fabriek voor Hoogwaardige Voedingsprodukten Kelderman BV, 1981
E.C.R. 527, 6 (stating that "obstacles to intra-community trade resulting from
disparities between the national laws relating to the marketing of the products in
question must be accepted in so far as those provisions may be... necessary in
order to satisfy imperative requirements relating to... consumer protection.");
Case 193/80, Commission v. Italy, 1981 E.C.R. 3019, 21 (noting that the
requirements are still necessary to satisfy mandatory requirements such as
consumer protection); Case 6/81, BV Industrie Diensten Groep v. J.A. Beele
Handelmaatschappij BV, 1982 E.C.R. 707, 13 (noting that the protection of
consumers constitutes the scope of the mandatory requirements); Case C-196/89,
Nespoli, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3647, T 14 (stating that "such rules are therefore
permissible under the Treaty only if... they.., are intended to satisfy
mandatory requirements relating, in particular, to consumer protection.").
203. See, e.g., Case C-368/95, Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und
Vertriebs GmbH v. Heinrich Bauer Verlag, 1997 E.C.R. 1-3689, $ 25, 27 (noting
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requirements. At the same time, the Court has pointed out that
none of its listings of such requirements is meant to be
exhaustive. z"
Hence, in order to identify the imperative requirements that
may justify a restriction on the freedom of establishment, three
steps need to be taken. The first one is to identify the goals
actually pursued by the relevant national measure. The second is
to examine whether these goals fit into any of the categories
already recognized by the Court. If any legislative goals are not
covered by any of the imperative requirements, one must consider
the recognition of a "new" imperative requirement.
a. The Goals of Codetermination Laws
In order to decide whether or not a national law serves
imperative requirements, one needs to identify the goal that is
actually pursued by the law in question. As mentioned before,. 5
the legislative history of the Codetermination Act of 1976 names
several considerations that are used to justify codetermination: the
protection of human dignity, the necessity to grant equal rights to
the providers of labor and capital, the democratization of
corporate decision-making and the necessity to limit
entrepreneurial power in general. 6
1. The Exact Meaning of the Goals of Codetermination
It is helpful to analyze each of the above-mentioned
considerations in more detail. First, the underlying idea behind the
protection of human dignity through codetermination, is that
that maintaining press diversity is a legitimate objective and suggesting that it
may be attained by less restrictive measures by the Member State).
204. REWE-Zentral, 1979 E.C.R. 649, 13 (noting that the argument that
fixing of minimum alcoholic contents may lead to standardization of products and
their designation "cannot be taken so far as to regard the mandatory fixing... as
an essential guarantee of the fairness of commercial transactions."); see also
KAPTEYN & VAN THEMAAT, supra note 112, at 676 (stating that "the interest or
values covered by the rule of reason do not constitute a closed class.").
205. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
206. See Drucksache des Bundestages [BT-Drs.] VI/334, 18-20.
2003] THE FUTURE OF CODETERMINATION 655
human dignity requires self-determination.2' Against this
background, it was seen as incompatible with the concept of human
dignity to treat the individual worker as a mere "cog in the
wheel."2°
The argument that the providers of capital and labor should be
granted equal rights is more problematic. The legislative materials
strongly suggest that this consideration was not so much seen as a
legislative goal in itself. Rather, equal treatment of the providers
of capital and labor was considered to be necessary in order to
protect the interests of workers against adverse decisions by their
employers, i.e., corporations. Thus, in explaining the concept of
equal treatment of capital and labor, the relevant committee report
points to the argument that workers, too, bear the risk inherent in
business judgments.' It is also mentioned that the loss of
employment may be even more burdensome than the loss of the
capital invested in a corporation.21 In sum, the legislative goal in
question can be defined as the protection of the workers against
adverse decisions by the corporation.
With respect to the principle of democracy, it was suggested
that this principle should not be confined to politics.2 ' Corporate
power, too, was seen to be in need of democratic legitimacy."'
The legislative materials also mention the argument that
codetermination is necessary to limit entrepreneurial power in
general.2 3 The relevant committee report makes it clear that this
concept was understood broadly.' It is pointed out that
entrepreneurs, if unchecked, may abuse their power not only vis-A-
vis workers and consumers,2 5 but also in the political sector.2"6
In sum, the legislative history indicates that the legislation
considered, if not necessarily endorsed, the following goals: the
207. See id. at 18.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 19.
211. See id.
212 See id.
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protection of human dignity, the protection of workers against
adverse decisions by corporations, the democratization of
corporate decision-making and the limitation of entrepreneurial
power in general.
2. The Relevance of Legislative Intent
One may argue that the four above-mentioned legislative goals
need not be the only imperative requirements that may justify the
German system of codetermination. In fact, the Court has never
held that a statute must be motivated by a particular imperative
requirement in order to be justified by an imperative
requirement."7 It follows that the above-mentioned goals may not
include all the possible justifications for the German system of
codetermination. Rather, codetermination may have other
benefits that were not considered by the legislature in 1976, but are
217. For examples of the European Court not holding that an imperative
requirement for a statute must have actually motivated the legislature, but
holding that certain national statutes may be justified as being necessary for
consumer protection and fair trading, even if they may cause obstacles to intra-
Community trade, see Case 120/78, REWE-Zentral AG v.
Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649, 8; Case 58/80,
Dansk Supermarked A/S v. A/S Imerco, 1981 E.C.R. 181, 13; Case 6/81, BV
Industrie Diensten Groep v. J.A. Beele Handelmaatschappij BV, 1982 E.C.R.
707, 91 7; Case 182/84, Miro BV, 1985 E.C.R. 3731, 9 14; Case 179/85, Commission
v. Germany, 1986 E.C.R. 3879, %1 10; Case C-238/89, Pall Corp. v. P.J. Dahlhausen
& Co., 1990 E.C.R. 1-4827, T 12; Case C-293/93, Houtwipper, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4249,
T 20 (noting that the German legislation provides a range of measures that have
the equivalent effect of assuring fair trading). But see the opinion of Advocate
General Jacobs in Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag AG, 2001
E.C.R. 1-2099, 1 209. There, one of the questions was whether a law privileging
German suppliers of renewable energy could be justified on the basis of Article
36 of the EC Treaty, given that the Court had previously recognized the aim of
ensuring a minimum supply of petroleum products at all times is to be regarded
as capable of constituting an objective covered by the concept of public security.
The Advocate General dismissed this argument on the grounds that the positive
consequences of the relevant statute on the security of energy supply were a mere
positive side-effect, the objectives of the statute being essentially environmental.
This reasoning seems to imply that positive effects of a national statute that were
not intended by the national legislature cannot serve as a justification for
restricting the fundamental freedoms.
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nevertheless capable of providing a justification. While such
reasoning would be correct, there is not much reason to believe
that the German system of codetermination could be justified by
considerations that are not included among the objectives listed
above. In particular, there is little reason to believe that
codetermination produces net efficiency gains.218  It must be
remembered in this context that, at least in principle, the Member
States bear the burden of proof that their national measures are
indeed suited to attaining the objective that they pursue. 219 Even if
the Court recognized the creation of an efficient corporate law
regime as an imperative requirement, Germany would almost
certainly be unable to show that its system of codetermination
actually contributes to that goal. Hence, with regard to further
analysis, it seems reasonable to exclude efficiency considerations as
a possible justification for codetermination.
b. Defining Imperative Requirements
Among the imperative requirements that the European Court
218. Most studies have either been inconclusive or have come to the
conclusion that codetermination is inefficient. See, e.g., DIETER SADOWSKI,
MITBESTIMMUNG - GEWINNE UND INVESTITIONEN [CODETERMINATION -
PROFITS AND INVESTMENT] 82-83 (1997); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory
Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 IOWA J. CORP. L. 657, 678 (1996)
(finding no conclusive evidence that using employee involvement to improve the
attitudes and motivation of workers leads to long-term economic benefits); Felix
R. FitzRoy & Kornelius Kraft, Economic Effects of Codetermination, 95
SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 365, 366 (1993) (finding "no significant effects of
codetermination on productivity.").
219. See, e.g., Case C-128/89, Commission v. Italy, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3239, f 27
(finding the Italian government's measures were ill-suited for the purported
objectives); Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227, 91 14
(holding the Federal Republic of Germany's regulation failed to fulfill its claimed
purpose to safeguard public health); Case 51/83, Commission v. Italy, 1984
E.C.R. 2793, 91 1 (stating that Italy, by restricting the importation of certain
confectionary products failed to fulfill its obligations to justify the restriction). Cf
also Case C-17/93, Openbaar Ministerie v. Van der Veldt, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3537, TT
15-20 (finding that Belgian legislation prohibiting the marketing of bread and
other bakery products could not be adequately justified on the grounds of
protecting health).
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has recognized so far are the protection of workers,220 and - more
specifically - the improvement of working conditions.2 This said, it
is nevertheless worth asking whether the Court might recognize
additional imperative requirements in the context at hand.
1. The Protection of Human Dignity
There can be little doubt that the Court will recognize the
protection of human dignity, as an imperative requirement because
the Court has already stated that the inviolability of a person's
human dignity is one of the fundamental rights recognized and
protected by European Community law.2
2. The Democratization of the Workplace as a Goal Per Se
By contrast, it seems unlikely that the Court will categorize the
democratization of the workplace as an imperative requirement.
As stated above, the Court has never provided a definition of the
term "imperative requirement." Nevertheless, it is striking that the
imperative requirements recognized by the Court are always
worded in such a way as to ensure that most or even all Member
States, if asked, would agree that the relevant goals deserve to be
pursued. For example, the Member States of the Community will
easily be able to agree that "the cohesion of the national tax
systems" needs to be protected, even though they are unlikely to
agree on how these systems should look like. Similarly, the
protection of consumers, the protection of the environment, or the
prevention of unfair commercial practices are concepts that are
unlikely to spark opposition in principle. By contrast, the
democratization of the workplace is considered desirable in only
220. See Case C-279/00, Commission v. Italian Republic, 2002 E.C.R. 1-01425,
19.
221. See, e.g., Case 150/80, Oebel, 1981 E.C.R. 1993, $ 12.
222. See Case 26/29, Stauder v. City of Ulm-Sozialamt, 1969 E.C.R. 1419, 7.
Cf. also RUDOLF GEIGER, EG-VERTRAG [TREATY ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN UNION] 563-64, art. 164, 40 (listing the inviolability of a person's
human dignity as one of many fundamental human rights).
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some of the Member States.23 Hence, the Court will avoid stating
that this value constitutes an imperative requirement.
3. The Limitation of Entrepreneurial Power
Similarly, it is unlikely that the Court will recognize the
limitation of entrepreneurial power as an imperative requirement
per se. To do so would directly contradict the very concept of the
freedom of establishment. After all, the freedom of establishment
precisely amounts to the right to exercise a self-employed activity
without being confined by unjust limitations.
This does not mean, of course, that the prevention of certain
abuses of entrepreneurial power cannot be recognized as an
imperative requirement. As regards the abuse of entrepreneurial
power in the labor or product markets, there can be little doubt
that the prevention of such an abuse constitutes an imperative
requirement. The EC Treaty's rules on competition law,
particularly Articles 81 and 82, demonstrate the necessity to
prevent the abuse of market power.' Moreover, even though the
Court has not explicitly categorized the prevention of the abuse of
market power as an imperative requirement, the Court has stated
that the Member States can continue to apply their national
antitrust law even if Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty are also
applicable.2" Given that antitrust rules can render the exercise of
the freedom of establishment less attractive, holding that the
national antitrust rules remain applicable presupposes that they are
covered by an imperative requirement.
As regards the abuse of entrepreneurial power in the political
sector, the Court is equally likely to recognize this goal as an
imperative requirement. After all, the Member States must be free
223. Germany is not the only Member State prescribing the participation of
workers in the management of public corporations. See Hammen, supra note 23,
at 1491.
224. See Stephen McShea, The "Dominant Position" Doctrine and the
European Union's Response to the British Airways/American Airlines Alliance, 23
B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 71, 75 (1999) (stating that Articles 81 and 82 of the
EC Treaty outline the primary framework for the regulation of competition in
the EU).
225. See, e.g., Case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E.C.R. 1.
2003]
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to define their political system. 6 Correspondingly, national
measures aimed at preserving the integrity of the political system,
such as rules limiting the contributions to political parties, never
seem to have come under scrutiny by the Court.
c. Summary
In sum, it is likely that the Court will consider five imperative
requirements in the context of codetermination: the protection of
human dignity, the protection of workers against their employers,
the improvement of working conditions, the prevention of the
abuse of market power, and the protection of the integrity of the
political system.
iii. The Specification of Imperative Requirements
This leads to the question of whether the Member States, in
this case Germany, will be allowed any discretion in specifying the
above-mentioned imperative requirements.2V There can be little
doubt that the imperative requirements recognized by the Court
are often in need of specification, i.e., given a more concrete
definition, in order to be applied. Ideally, of course, the imperative
requirements themselves serve as focal points for evaluating
national measures: According to the imperative requirement
doctrine, national measures restricting the fundamental freedoms
are only justified if they are both suitable and necessary with
respect to the relevant requirement. 2 8 However, the imperative
requirements recognized by the Court are usually formulated too
vaguely to directly allow the evaluation of national measures. For
example, the Court has recognized the prevention of unfair
commercial practices as an imperative requirement." The
conclusion that a national measure is suitable and necessary to
prevent unfair commercial practices presupposes a definition of
what constitutes an unfair practice. The question, therefore, is
226. See supra Part Four (III)(A)(3)(e).
227. See supra Part Four (III).
228. See sources cited supra note 176.
229. See cases cited supra note 200.
2003] THE FUTURE OF CODETERMINATION 661
whether the Member States will be allowed discretion in defining
the relevant requirements. For example, will Germany be allowed
to argue that the German understanding of good working
conditions includes a "democratic workplace"?
In legal literature, this problem is largely neglected.
Commentators generally state that both the content and the scope
of imperative requirements are defined at the European level."0
This statement is technically correct, but does not really address
the issue at hand. The Court can easily define the scope and
content of an imperative requirement and still allow the Member
States discretion, namely, by choosing a definition of the relevant
imperative requirement that refers directly or indirectly to
decisions made by the Member States. The prevention of unfair
commercial practices may serve as an example. Regarding the
content of this requirement, the Court held in Dansk Supermarked
v. Imerco that "the marketing of imported goods may be
prohibited if the conditions on which they are sold constitute an
infringement on the marketing usages considered proper and fair
in the state of importation ..... ,'
While the Court has never addressed the problem on a general
level, the positions it has taken vary widely from case to case. As
Dansk Supermarked shows, the Court sometimes defines
imperative requirements in such a way as to leave broad discretion
to the Member States.232 This generous approach can also be
illustrated by the fact that the Court has recognized the cohesion of
the national tax system as an imperative requirement. 3 Given that
it is up to the Member States to choose their tax system in the first
place, the right to protect their national system leaves them
considerable room for maneuvering. In other cases, the Court has
taken a much more restrictive position. For example, the Court
has not left the Member States much discretion in specifying the
230. See, e.g., PETER-CHRISTIAN MOLLER-GRAFF, Artikel 30, in GROEBEN ET
AL., KOMMENTAR ZUM EU-/EG-VERTRAG [TREATISE ON THE EU/EC TREATY]
631, 704 j 206 (5TH ed. 1997).
231. Case 58/80, Dansk Supermarked A/S v. Imerco, 1981 E.C.R. 181, 15.
232. See id. $ 2.
233. See, e.g., Case C-204/90, Bachmann v. Belgium, 1992 E.C.R. 1-249; 30
C.M.L.R. 785 (1993) (noting that there is a "need to preserve the cohesion" of
national tax systems).
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goal of protecting consumers.34 Rather, it has developed what
scholars have called the concept of the "well-informed
consumer."' 5  In dealing with national rules pursuing the
protection of consumers, the Court regularly argues that
consumers can be expected to inform themselves by means of
product labels, 6 and can also be expected to be reasonably well
informed, observant and circumspect.f 7 Thus, by defining the
234. Cf., e.g., MOLLER-GRAFF, supra note 230, at 711 218; S. WEATHERILL,
The Evolution of European Consumer Law and Policy: From Well Informed
Consumer to Confident Consumer, in RECHTSEINHEIT ODER RECHTSVIELFALT IN
EUROPA [UNIFORM LAW OR LEGAL DIVERSITY IN EUROPE] 424, 424-40 (H.
Micklitz ed., 1996).
235. Cf CHALMERS & SZYSZCZAK, supra note 84, at 324-25 (stating that even
though a product might not comply with the specific labeling laws of a member
state, they are acceptable so long as the labeling is clearly understandable);
MOLLER-GRAFF, supra note 230, at 711 218; WEATHERILL, supra note 234, at
424-30.
236. See, e.g., Case C-293/93, Straffesag v. Houtwipper Neeltje, 1994 E.C.R. I-
4249, 20 (stating that a hallmark informing consumers about the fitness of a
precious metal affixed in accordance with legislature of exporting Member State
is enough to satisfy consumer protection statutes of importing Member States);
Case 27/80, Fietje, 1980 E.C.R. 3839, 12 (holding that if a label contains the
same information as prescribed by rules of importing state and can be understood
by consumers of that state, no alterations to the label are necessary); Case 788/79,
Gilli and Andres, 1980 E.C.R. 2071, IT 7-8 (holding that a product clearly
labeled as apple vinegar cannot be prohibited for sale on grounds that consumers
might confuse it with wine vinegar); Case 261/81, Rau v. De Smedt, 1982 E.C.R.
3961, [1983] 20 C.M.L.R. 496 (stating that labeling of a product as margarine is as
effective of a way to inform the consumer about the product and hinders the free
movement of goods less than requiring all margarine to be sold in cubic packages
only).
237. See, e.g., Case 220/98, Estee Lauder Cosmetics GmbH & Co. OHG v.
Lancaster Group GmbH, 2000 E.C.R. 1-117, 32 (holding that a legislature of a
Member state may prohibit importation of a cosmetic product containing word
'lifting' if a reasonably informed, observant consumer will be misled by such
labeling); Case C-210/96, Gut Springenheide and Tusky, 1998 E.C.R. 1-4657, IT
31-32 (stating that in assessing whether the label is misleading, national courts
should take into consideration expectations of an average consumer who is
reasonably informed, observant and circumspect); Case C-470/93, Verein gegen
Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe K61n v. Mars GmbH, 1995 E.C.R. 1-1923, 24
(finding that a "+10%" marking on a wrapping where a marking occupies more
than 10% of the total surface wrapping should not mislead a reasonably
circumspect consumer into thinking that there is a link between surface area
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standards that consumers must meet, the Court has given its own
interpretation to the imperative requirement of protecting
consumers.
In my view, these seeming inconsistencies can be explained as
follows. Giving the Member States discretion in specifying the
imperative requirements will necessarily reduce the level of judicial
scrutiny. Hence, the Court will naturally be reluctant to grant such
discretion. However, in some cases, the Member States of the
European Community may be able to agree that a certain
legislative goal is sufficiently important enough to restrict the
fundamental freedoms, but the Member States have different
preferences in detail, and therefore, cannot agree on the exact
content or definition of the relevant imperative requirement. In
this case, the Court could simply impose one of the different
concepts of the relevant imperative requirement. However, the
more the different national preferences diverge, the more
inefficient such a solution would be. Hence, it seems more
reasonable in such cases to simply grant the Member States a
certain amount of discretion, while at the same time ensuring that
they do not abuse this discretion for protectionist purposes. This
would explain, for example, why the Court has not granted the
Member States much discretion in specifying the concept of
consumer protection: Many of the relevant national rules deal with
the packaging and labeling of products as well as with quality
standards that products have to meet.3 Such rules, however, tend
to make it much more difficult for producers from other Member
States to enter the national market, given that such producers may
have to comply with both the rules of their own state and the rules
of the state of destination. Hence, the Court will naturally tend to
disregard diverging national preferences in order to prevent
protectionism.
A mixed picture results if this reasoning is applied to the
imperative requirements that are relevant in the context of
codetermination.
marking and actual increase in size and quantity).
23& Gilli and Andres, 1980 E.C.R. 2071 (labeling of vinegar); Rau, 1982
E.C.R. 3961 (packaging of margarine).
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a. The Protection of Human Dignity
Regarding the protection of human dignity, several factors
suggest that the Court will not allow the Member States discretion
in defining this requirement. The inviolability of human dignity is
often considered to be rooted in natural rather than merely
positive law."' This implies that the content of this concept cannot
depend on national preferences. Another factor to be considered
in this context is that the Court has already recognized the
inviolability of human dignity as a fundamental right binding the
European Community's own authorities. " Therefore, the Court
will sooner or later be forced to define this concept on the
European level anyway, namely in cases where citizens invoke the
inviolability of human dignity against acts of the European
Community. It is unlikely that the Court will find it plausible to
define human dignity in a certain way, while at the same time
allowing the Member States to give a different meaning to the
same concept.
b. The Improvement of Working Conditions
As regards the improvement of working conditions, the Court
will likely grant the Member States broad discretion. While some
preferences regarding this issue may be identical in all the Member
States, e.g., limits on working hours, many of the relevant issues
will strongly depend on national preferences. A rule prohibiting
smoking at work is one obvious example, and codetermination is
another. It depends on the preferences of the workers whether
they derive any non-monetary benefits from being able to
239. This does not mean, of course, that positive law cannot guarantee the
inviolability of human dignity. For example, such a guarantee is contained in
Article 1 (1) of the German Constitution. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [CONSTITUTION]
art. 1(1) (F.R.G.).
240. See, e.g., KAPTEYN & VAN THEMAAT, supra note 112, at 282 ("Written
Community law contains no specific provision dealing with respect for
fundamental rights in the Community authorities' dealings with Community
citizens."). However, in 1969, the European Court of Justice held that
fundamental human rights are enshrined in the general principles of Community
law and that the inviolability of human dignity is among these fundamental
rights. See Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm-Sozialamt, 1969 E.C.R. 419, 7.
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influence the firm's decision-making. At the same time, the
protectionist effects of the German system of codetermination are
limited in that corporations can easily avoid being subject to
diverging national rules. Corporations employing fewer than 500
employees in Germany do not fall under the German statutes on
codetermination.' Corporations employing more than 500
workers in Germany can avoid the application of diverging
national rules by forming a subsidiary company for their operations
in Germany.242
c. The Protection of Workers Against their Employers
Similarly, the Court is likely to grant the Member States a
certain amount of discretion in defining the concept of protecting
workers against their employers. In order to decide which rules
protect workers, one has to determine the preferences of workers.
These will vary from state to state. For example, a rule restricting
working hours at the price of lower wages may be seen to protect
workers in some states but not in others. Consequently, if the
German system of codetermination were to reduce the number of
layoffs while at the same time leading to lower average wages, the
Court would probably accept the claim that this result is in line
with the German conception of protecting workers.
d. The Prevention of the Abuse of Market Power
As regards the prevention of the abuse of market power, the
Court is also likely to grant the Member States a certain level of
discretion. After all, the determination of the most suitable
antitrust rules is closely related to the individual structure of a
country's economy. In any case, the question of discretion is
unlikely to be of importance with respect to this particular
imperative requirement, given that the German law of
codetermination does not seem to presuppose an understanding of
241. Hartmut Dietrich, Co-Determination of Employees In the Governance of
the Enterprise, in BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY (FRG) § 31.03(3)(a)(i)
(Dennis Campbell ed.) (1985).
242. Id. § 31.03(2)(a)(ii).
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market power and its abuse that differs from the understanding of
those concepts underlying antitrust legislation in general.
e. The Integrity of the Political System
Concerning the integrity of a Member State's political system,
too, the Court is likely to grant the Member States a certain
amount of discretion. The very concept of integrity presupposes
value judgments that depend on national preferences. At the same
time, there is no obvious risk that the Member States could abuse
their discretion for protectionist purposes.
2. Suitability
In order for a restriction on the fundamental freedom to be
justified under the imperative requirement doctrine, the relevant
national measure must be well suited to attaining the objective that
it pursues.243 In applying this criterion, the Court focuses on two
aspects: the measure's suitability to further the legislative goal and
the consistency of national legislation vis-A-vis the objective in
question. 244
i. Furthering the Legislative Goal
It is generally accepted that in order to pass the suitability test,
the Member State has to make a plausible showing that the
measure contributes in more than an insubstantial way to the
realization of the imperative requirement." If there are different
possible measures to choose from, the Court gives the Member
States broad discretion in choosing the measure they consider most
243. See, e.g., Case C-19/92, Kraus v. Land Baden-Wfirtemberg, 1993 E.C.R. I-
1663, 32; Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'ordine degli avvocati e
procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 37.
244. See Opinion of Advocate General, Case C-17/00, De Coster v. College
des bourgmestre et echevins de Watermael-Boitsfort, 2001 E.C.R. 1-9445, 124;
Opinion of Advocate General, Case C-255/97, Pfeiffer GroBhandel GmbH v.
Lowa Warenhandel GmbH, 1999 E.C.R. 1-2835, 43.
245. See, e.g., MOLLER-GRAFF, supra note 230, at 830 130.
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appropriate. 6 If this test is applied to the different aims of
codetermination, the outcome is likely to differ with regard to the
different imperative requirements that are relevant in this context.
a. The Improvement of Working Conditions
Given that a democratic workplace constitutes an improved
working condition per se, Germany will have no trouble showing
that the German system of codetermination improves working
conditions.
b. The Protection of Workers Against their Employers
With regard to the protection of workers against the power of
their employers, Germany will be expected to show that
codetermined companies are comparatively less likely to make
decisions that affect the interests of workers in an adverse manner.
In fact, both intuition and existing research suggest that the
representatives of workers will have at least some success at
preventing corporate decisions that are perceived as harmful to the
interests of workers. 47 This is true, in particular, with regard to
restructuring measures leading to layoffs.4 8 Of course, this does
246. See, e.g., Case 293/93, Straffesag v. Houtwipper Neeltje, 1994 E.C.R. I-
4249, 22 (discussing Member States' wide discretion in choosing appropriate
measures for requirements of hallmarking articles of precious metals).
247. See, e.g., GARY GORTON & FRANK SCHMID, CLASS STRUGGLE INSIDE
THE FIRM: A STUDY OF GERMAN CODETERMINATION 5-6 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 7945, 2000) at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7945 (showing empirically that employees have
some success at preventing restructuring efforts). Theoretical models reach the
same conclusion. See Chun Chang, Capital Structure as an Optimal Contract
Between Employees and Investors, 47 J. FIN. 1141, 1141-58 (1992) (creating a
theoretical model achieving optimal contract by a debt-equity combination and a
compensation schedule); Hajime Miyazaki, Internal Bargaining, Labor Contracts,
and a Marshallian Theory of the Firm, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 381, 381-93 (1984)
(creating a theoretical model investigating the effect of varying degrees of labor's
bargaining power on firm policies and predicting employee resistance to
restructuring, layoffs, and wage reductions).
248. See, e.g., GORTON & SCHMID, supra note 247, at 5-6 (noting specifically
employee resistance to restructuring, lay-offs and wage reductions).
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not prove conclusively that the interests of workers are effectively
served. It may be that codetermination promotes the interests of
workers in the short run, but runs contrary to the workers' interests
in the long run, namely, by preventing the most efficient allocation
of capital. Moreover, codetermination may protect workers at the
expense of the unemployed by preventing firms from being
restructured in a more efficient manner. However, it has already
been mentioned above that the Member States enjoy a certain
amount of discretion in specifying the requirement of protecting
workers."9 Hence, it must be left to the Member States to
determine whether they wish to promote the short-term interests
of workers at expense of their long-term interests. Similarly, only
the Member States can balance the interests of the employed and
the unemployed.
c. The Protection of Human Dignity
It seems unlikely that the Court will consider the German
system of codetermination adequate in protecting human dignity.
In order to do so, the Court would have to accept the idea that
human dignity requires a democratic workplace. Not all Member
States adhere to a system of codetermination, ° and even in
Germany most workers work in firms that are not subject to the
law of codetermination. Hence, in considering human dignity to
require a democratic workplace, the Court would have to make an
assumption that the law of some Member States violates human
dignity.
d. The Prevention of the Abuse of Market Power
By contrast, it seems highly probable that the Court will
consider the German rules on codetermination sufficient to
prevent the abuse of market power. Workers have an interest in
preventing the enterprise from exploiting potential market power
249. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
250. See, e.g., Beth L. Roberts, The Impact of the Maastricht Summit on
European Community Social Policy: A Breakthrough for Codetermination or the
Creation of a Two-Speed Europe?, 28 TEX. INT'L L.J. 357, 372 (1993).
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vis-A-vis its employees. Hence, the workers' representatives will
attempt to prevent such exploitation. Similarly, it is plausible to
argue that the workers' representatives will be less inclined than
the shareholders' representatives to support the use of market
power in the product market. Any abuse of market power aims at
raising prices to a supracompetitive level."M This means, however,
that the level of production will be suboptimal.252 Such a scenario
may be attractive to shareholders who are interested in profits
rather than in the level of production. However, it is far less
appealing to workers. They do not, as a rule, share the increased
profits resulting from the supracompetitive prices. 3 At the same
time, the suboptimal level of production runs counter to their
interests. In particular, under German labor law the individual
worker's risk of being laid off decreases when additional workers
are hired."' That is because, ceteris paribus, firms that wish to
reduce the size of their work force generally have to lay off the
more recently employed workers first. 5  Moreover, intuition
suggests that an increase in the size of the workforce will tend to
result in greater chances for the individual worker of being
promoted.
e. The Integrity of the Political Process
As mentioned above, the Court will likely grant the Member
251. See, e.g., ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIc, ANTITRUST LAW
AND ECONOMICS 66 (4th ed. 1994) (contrasting monopolies with perfectly
competitive industries); WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 548,
573-74 (7th ed. 1998) (setting forth a mathematical model).
252. See, e.g., GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 251, at 66.
253. See id.
254. According to section 1(1) of the Kiindigungsschutzgesetz [Protection
Against Unlawful Dismissal Act] of August 25, 1969, Bundesgesetzblatt 1 1317,
the dismissal of a worker who has been employed for more than six months is
only valid if the dismissal is socially justified.
Kuindigungsschutzgesetz,v.25.8.1969 (BGBI.I S.1317). According to section 1(3)
of the same statute, the dismissal of a worker for business reasons rather than for
reasons that lie in the person of the worker is socially unjustified if the employer
does not sufficiently take into account social considerations in determining which
workers are to be dismissed. Id. (BGBI.I S).
255. See id.
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States discretion in defining the integrity of the political process.25
Hence, the Court will probably accept the argument that the
integrity of the political process requires that corporations be
prevented from exercising their power in the political arena. In the
context at hand, therefore, the question is whether the German
system of codetermination actually furthers this aim. While no
empirical research seems to exist on this issue, one can plausibly
argue on a theoretical level that this question has to be answered in
the affirmative. In the German political system, entrepreneurs and
workers tend to pursue different and often incompatible aims.
Hence, both the representatives of workers and the representatives
of shareholders will generally attempt to make sure that the other
side does not use the power of the corporation to further its
political aims.
f Summary
In sum, Germany will likely be able to show that
codetermination contributes to the goals of protecting workers
against their employers, improving working conditions, preventing
the abuse of market power, and protecting the integrity of the
political process. By contrast, there is no reason to believe that
Germany will be able to prove that codetermination protects
human dignity.
ii. Inconsistency as an Obstacle to Suitability
The question remains whether the German system is unsuited
to attaining its objectives, because it does not apply across the
board to all companies, let alone all legal entities. It should be
recalled, in this context, that the scope of application of the
German system of codetermination is limited in a variety of ways.
For example, it only applies to certain organizational forms; 7 and
even if it were extended to cover pseudo-foreign corporations, it
256. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
257. See Coal and Steel Codetermination Act, supra note 55, §1;
Codetermination Act, supra note 62, §1; Industrial Constitution Act of 1952,
supra note 73, §§ 76, 77.
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still would not be applicable to corporations having their real seat
abroad."' The question is whether the above-described limits to
the scope of application of the law of codetermination call into
question its suitability to attain its various objectives.
a. The Court's Aproach to Inconsistent Legislation
According to the Court, a national measure may be considered
unsuitable if it pursues its objectives in an incomplete, half-hearted
manner. 9 The exact scope of this criterion, however, is not always
clear.
In Centros, the Court seems to apply a particularly harsh
standard. There, the Danish government had advanced the
argument that the minimum capital requirement imposed by
Danish law was necessary to protect creditors."u The Court,
however, argued that the Danish minimum requirement was "not
such as to attain the objective of protecting creditors which it
purports to pursue since, if the company concerned had conducted
business in the United Kingdom, its branch would have been
registered in Denmark, even though Danish creditors might have
been equally exposed to risk."26' At first glance, this reasoning
seems to suggest that whenever national legislation has loopholes
or does not completely eliminate an unwanted risk, it is considered
unsuitable. Regarding codetermination, it could be argued that the
German system of codetermination will not attain its goals,
because corporations can avoid this system by establishing their
25& See id.
259. See, e.g., Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227, [1988]
1 C.M.L.R. 780. Cf. also PETER VON WILMOWSKY, EUROPAISCHES
KREDITSICHERUNGSRECHT [EUROPEAN LAW OF SECURED TRANSACrIONS] 13-
14 (1996) (stating that the European Court of Justice demands that any national
measure restricting fundamental rights must be proportionate to its goals);
WULF-HENNING ROTH, Das Allgemeininteresse im europjischen Internationalen
Vertragsrecht [The Public Interest in the Context of Rules Governing Conflicts of
Laws in the Field of Insurance Law], VERSICHERUNGSRECHT [VERsR] 129, 137
(1993).
260. See Opinion of the Advocate General Pergola, Case C-212/97, Centros
Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, IT 6-7.
261. Centros Ltd., 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, 35.
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real seat in another Member State.262
However, Centros has to be examined in the context of prior
case law. Traditionally, the Court has only used the
"incompleteness" of national legislation to question a measure's
legality where the national legislation seemed inconsistent, i.e.,
where no reason existed for the merely partial pursuit of a certain
legislative goal.263 The Court's case law on national legislation
banning the use of additives in the production of food may serve to
illustrate this point. In Commission v. Germany (1987), the Court
faced a German statute banning the use of all but a few additives in
the production of beer. 64 The Court stressed the fact that the
Member States were free to ban additives if there were reasonable
grounds to believe that these additives might be harmful to the
health of consumers.265 However, as the Court pointed out,
German law was inconsistent in that some of the additives that
could not legally be used to produce beer could be legally used in
the production of virtually all other beverages. 2 6 Given that there
were no reasons for this inconsistency, the Court held the
German law in question to violate Community law.
2 68
In my view, the Court's reasoning in Centros, too, can be
explained as an example of this inconsistency principle. The
Danish authorities did not provide any reasons why it should be
necessary to subject pseudo-foreign companies to harsher
requirements than other companies formed under U.K. law and
doing business in Denmark.219 This does not necessarily mean that
no such reasons existed. Companies located in the U.K. are
262. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
263. See WILMOWSKY, supra note 259, at 13-14.
264. See Commission v. Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227.
265. See id. [ 42.
266. See id. 49.
267. See id.
268. See id. 53.
269. See Opinion of the Advocate General Pergola, Case C-212/97, Centros
Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, 6 (summarizing the
reasoning of the Danish Companies Board which argued that the requirement in
respect of minimum capital for limited companies, imposed by Danish law to
protect the interests of companies and their employees and creditors, was a
perfectly legitimate measure despite the absence of harmonization on the subject
at Community level).
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subject to certain administrative controls that aim at preventing the
formation of corporations for fraudulent purposes."0 Doing
business only in Denmark, Centros Ltd. was not subject to these
controls."7 Hence, there was an objective reason for subjecting
Centros Ltd. to stricter standards than companies having their real
seat in the U.K. However, the Court may not have been aware of
this fact. At least, neither the opinion of the Advocate General
nor the Court's judgment mentions this point.27
b. Are the German Statutes on Codetermination Inconsistent?
It follows from the above that the limited scope of application
of the German system of codetermination is only likely to call into
question the suitability of the German laws on codetermination if it
cannot be justified in a plausible way. Before this question is
examined in detail, a caveat seems appropriate. Even if the limited
scope of the German system of codetermination were found to
violate Article 43 of the EC Treaty, this would hardly seal the fate
of codetermination. After all, the German legislature has to
modify the German codetermination statutes anyway if they are to
be applied to pseudo-foreign companies, and hence, any
inconsistencies could be straightened out as well. Notwithstanding
this possibility, the present article focuses on whether the German
system of codetermination in its present form could be extended to
cover pseudo-foreign corporations. Hence, it is appropriate to ask
whether additional modifications are necessary in order for the
German codetermination statutes to pass the scrutiny of the Court.
Obviously, this task first necessitates an inquiry into potential
inconsistencies regarding the scope of application of the statutes on
codetermination. In this context, several issues are of importance.
To begin with, the different statutes only apply to certain
organizational forms," and, in case of the Coal and Steel
270. See, e.g., L. C. B. GOWER, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 684
(1999); ZIMMER, supra note 23, at 1364; Ulmer, supra note 23, at 664.
271. See Centros Ltd., 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, 3.
272. See id.; Opinion of the Advocate General Pergola, Centros Ltd., 1999
E.C.R. 1-1459, IT 11-22 (making no mention of the fact that Centros Ltd., doing
business only in Denmark, was not subject to U.K. control).
273. See Codetermination Act, supra note 62 and accompanying text;
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Codetermination Act, to certain industries.14  Moreover, the
different codetermination laws each presuppose a certain number
of employees. 75 Also, even if the codetermination laws were
extended to cover pseudo-foreign corporations, corporations
having their seat in another country would still be beyond the
reach of the German system of codetermination."6
Finally, the German system of codetermination has two main
loopholes that are frequently used for the purpose of
circumventing the relevant statutes. The first loophole concerns
the law of corporate groups. 7 German law allows for so-called
controlling agreements between two corporations.278 A controlling
agreement allows the controlling corporation to impose its
decisions on the managing board of the controlled corporation.79
Thereby, the supervisory board of the controlled corporation is
basically cut off from the decision-making process."0 This may not
matter in cases where the controlling corporation is subject to
codetermination. However, if the real seat of the controlling
corporation is situated in another country, the German statutes on
codetermination are not applicable."'
The second loophole concerns limited partnerships. Limited
partnerships do not fall under the law of codeterminationf 2
Industrial Constitution Act of 1952, supra note 73 and accompanying text.
274. See Coal and Steel Codetermination Act, supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
275. See id. § 1(2) (specifying 1000 employees); Codetermination Act, supra
note 62, § 1(1)(1) (specifying 200 employees); Industrial Constitution Act of
1952, supra note 73, §§ 76(6), 77 (specifying 500 employees).
276. See supra note 83.
277. See, e.g., ZIMMER, supra note 23, at 157-59.
278. See German Stock Corporations Act, supra note 50, § 291.
279. See German Stock Corporations Act, supra note 50, § 308. Cf. also
KARSTEN SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 954-58, § 31.
280. Cf. German Stock Corporations Act, supra note 50, § 308 (making it clear
that the managing board has to obey the instructions it receives from the
controlling corporation, even if these instructions harm the interests of the
controlled corporation).
281. ZIMMER, supra note 23, at 157-59.
282. See Coal and Steel Codetermination Act, supra note 55, § 1(2) (1000
employees); Codetermination Act, supra note 62, § 1(1)(1) (specifying 2000
employees); Industrial Constitution Act of 1952, supra note 73, §§ 76(6), 77
2003] THE FUTURE OF CODETERMINA TION
However, from the point of view of entrepreneurs, the limited
partnership has the disadvantage that at least one partner faces
unlimited liability.283 German law allows for this partner to be a
corporation.' If the shares of this corporation are held by the
limited partners, the employees of the partnership are considered
employees of the corporation,285 and thereby the corporation itself
is subject to the law of codetermination.286 In sum, partnerships
generally do not permit the avoidance of codetermination without
incurring unlimited liability. Nevertheless, a legal loophole exists.
According to the prevailing view, the general partner can be a
corporation that has its seat in another country, and therefore,
does not fall under the German statutes on codeterminationY"
Of the issues listed above, the limitation to firms of a certain
size is least problematic. One can plausibly argue that the
organizational and financial burdens imposed by the
codetermination rules are easier to bear for larger companies.
Similarly, the exemption of non-corporate entities from the
statutes on codetermination can be justified without particular
problems. 8 The exempted organizations generally fall into at least
one of two categories. 289  The first category includes those
(specifying 500 employees).
282. See, e.g., ZIMMER, supra note 23, at 157-59.
283. See § 162 HGB.
284. The German Commercial Code does not explicitly mention this
organizational form. However, German courts have long recognized the
possibility that limited liability companies function as general partners in a
limited partnership.
285. See Codetermination Act, supra note 62, § 4(1).
286. See Coal and Steel Codetermination Act, supra note 55, § 1(2).
287. See, e.g., Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht [Bavarian Supreme Court],
WERTPAPIER-MITrEILUNGEN 968, 970 (1986); OLG Saarbruecken [Court of
Appeals of Saarbrficken], Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft [RIW] 38 (1993),
848 (850) (Saarbriicken lacked jurisdiction over the Defendant because he was
not domiciled in the enforcing state).
288. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
289. Another exemption is the so-called registered commercial association
formed under § 22 BGB (members of such associations avoid both unlimited
liability and codetermination). However, the formation of a registered
commercial association presupposes a special concession. And there exists a
general agreement that this concession is only to be granted if the persons
concerned cannot reasonably be expected to choose another organizational form.
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organizations in which at least one of the firms' owners faces
unlimited personal liability.29 With regard to these organizations,
the exemption from the codetermination statutes can be defended
on the grounds that incompetent decision-making on the part of
workers' representatives can have particularly harsh consequences.
The second category consists of firms that serve non-profit
purposes.291 In this case, the exemption seems justified by the need
to encourage the creation of such firms.
The fact that the application of the Coal and Steel
Codetermination Act is limited to specific industries poses more
difficult problems. The scope of application of this particular
statute has historical reasons. After World War II, the relevant
firms accepted codetermination, because they saw it as a way to
avoid decartelization"' The Coal and Steel Codetermination Act
See, e.g., BVerwG 58, 26 (1978). For this reason, the registered commercial
association is of very limited practical importance. See SCHMIDT, supra note 3, at
683-84, § 24.
290. This is true with regard to partnerships. See § 128 HGB; §§ 128, 161(2)
HGB (holding this true regarding limited partnerships); §735 BGB (holding this
true regarding civil-law partnerships).
291. This is particularly true with regard to the so-called unincorporated
association. See § 54 BGB; § 21 BGB (regarding the so-called incorporated
association and stating that an association not intended for commercial purposes
attains legal status by its entry onto Register of Associations).
292. See, e.g., Benjamin A. Streeter III, Codetermination in West-Germany:
Through the Best (and Worst) of Times, 58 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 981, 983 (1982)
(stating that the 1951 Act did not only benefit trade unions but it meant all
workers would be represented). Given its role in the Third Reich, the Allies
viewed the coal and steel industries with suspicion. Plans existed to decartelize
the industry, i.e., to break up existing trusts. See Hans-Jtrgen Teuteberg,
Urspriinge und Entwicklungen der Mitbestimmung in Deutschland [Origin and
Development of Codetermination in Germany], in CODETERMINATION - ORIGINS
AND DEVELOPMENT 7, 51 (Hans Pohl ed., 1981). The concerned corporations
hoped to gain the support of the workers in opposing these decartelization
efforts. See Streeter, supra note 292, at 986. Against this background, the British
military government finally introduced a system of codetermination in the coal
and steel industries that was to become the model for the Coal and Steel
Codetermination Act. See Hans G. Nutzinger, Institutions and Experiences, in
CODETERMINATION: AN APPROACH FROM A DIFFERENT DIRECTION 163, 166 (J.
Backhaus & H.G. Nutzinger eds., 1989). Why the British opted for
codetermination, is not entirely clear. One consideration may have been to
prevent social instability. See H.J. SPIRO, THE POLITICS OF GERMAN
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that was later adopted by the German legislature mainly aimed at
preserving this status quo.9  Hence, the Court will hardly agree
with the assertion that a harsher form of codetermination in the
coal and steel industries is justified. Consequently, it is unlikely
that the German legislature can extend the scope of application of
the Coal and Steel Codetermination Act to pseudo-foreign
companies without violating their freedom of establishment.
As regards the exemption of companies having their seat
abroad, the Court's reasoning in Centros on the one hand seems to
suggest that the Court will not tolerate this exemption.29" After all,
in Centros, the Court pointed out that a minimum capital
requirement cannot protect creditors if the same requirement does
not apply to corporations having their real seat in the U.K.295 This
seems to imply that the German system of codetermination cannot
protect workers or improve working conditions if it is only
applicable to corporations having their real seat in Germany.
On the other hand, the Court has frequently pointed out that
as a general principle, Member States cannot restrict the
fundamental freedoms in order to protect the interests of other
Member States.296 Consequently, Germany cannot impose its
CODETERMINATION 32-34 (1958).
293. See, e.g., Streeter, supra note 292, at 983.
294. See Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999
E.C.R. 1-1459, 35.
295. See id.
296. See, e.g., Case C-169/89, Gourmetterie Van den Burg, 1990 E.C.R. I-
2143, T 17 (holding that member states may not introduce stricter measures for
protecting a given species of bird which is neither migratory nor endangered than
that of the member state on whose territory the bird in question occurs); Case C-
5/94, Ex parte Hedley Lomas Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-2553, 91 20 (holding that a state
cannot under any circumstances unilaterally adopt corrective measures to
prevent the failure of another Member State to comply with a treaty); see also
Opinion of Advocate General Trabuchi, Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v.
Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, 6; [1974] 11 C.M.L.R. 436, J1 6 (stating that if a
Member State takes measures to prevent unfair practices those measures must be
both reasonable in their means and should not act as a hindrance to trade
between other Member States); ANDREAS ZIEGLER, THE COMMON MARKET
AND THE ENVIRONMENT: STRIKING A BALANCE 103-04 (1995); Ulrich Everling,
Die Wiederaufbereitung abgrebrannter Brennelemente in anderen Mitgliedstaaten
der Euorpidischen Gemeinschaft [The reprocessing of used fuel elements in other
Member States of the European Community], RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN
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system of codetermination on foreign companies in such a way that
workers in other Member States are given the right to be
represented on the supervisory board of foreign corporations. This
leads to the following problem: If German law ensures that
workers employed by foreign corporations in Germany are
represented on the board of their corporations while failing to
ensure such representation with regard to workers employed by
foreign corporations in other countries, then corporate decision-
making will be biased in favor of workers employed in Germany as
opposed to workers employed elsewhere.
For foreign firms that are headquartered in another Member
State, this would make codetermination much more burdensome,
because the interests of the workers employed in Germany may be
even less in line with the interests of shareholders than the interests
of workers in general. The reason is that the workers employed in
Germany will often form a small minority and will therefore tend
to exploit their influence in the supervisory board at the expense of
the corporation as a whole. If, on the other hand, the number of
workers' representatives is reduced in such a way as to correspond
to the percentage of workers employed in Germany,
codetermination may become largely ineffective. Against this
background, a rule limiting the scope of application of
codetermination statutes to companies having their real seat in
Germany cannot be deemed inconsistent.
The question remains whether the two legal loopholes existing
in the law of codetermination would pass the scrutiny of the
Court.'l This seems doubtful because they do not serve any
particular purpose. The German legislature could simply prohibit
the constructions described above to the extent that they are used
to circumvent the law of codetermination298
WIRTSCHAFr [RIW], Beilage 2, 1, 10 (1993) (stating that a member state may not
force its policies on other member states through autonomous restrictions of
fundamental freedoms).
297. See supra notes 277, 282 and accompanying text.
298. Admittedly, this would restrict the Freedom of Establishment. See supra
note 296. However, given that the law of codetermination serves at least one
imperative requirement, namely the improvement of working conditions, this
restriction would be justified.
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iii. Summary
By and large, the limits on the scope of application of the
German codetermination statutes are unlikely to lead to a violation
of European law. However, an exception must be made for the
Coal and Steel Codetermination Act, which arbitrarily imposes a
harsher regime on firms in a certain industry. 9 Likewise, the two
loopholes in the German system of codetermination described
above are unlikely to pass scrutiny by the Court.3"
3. Necessity
The imperative requirement doctrine dictates that a national
measure may not go beyond what is necessary."' In other words,
there must be no equally effective, but less burdensome restriction.
This criterion does not pose a problem with regard to the
protection of workers against their employers. Admittedly, it is at
least possible that the benefits of codetermination could be
achieved in some other way, e.g., by restricting the right of
employers to dismiss employees. But it should be rather hard to
show that such restrictions would prove less burdensome to
employers.
Similarly, the improvement of working conditions cannot be
achieved in a less burdensome way. At least, this is true if one
subscribes to the view suggested above, namely that the Member
States are at liberty to define a "democratic workplace" as an
improvement per se.
With regard to the prevention of the abuse of market power,
the case is more problematic. One could argue that the problem of
market power is already addressed by antitrust rules, both on the
299. See supra note 289.
300. See supra notes 277, 282.
301. See, e.g., Case C-19/92, Kraus v. Land Baden-Wtirtemberg, 1993 E.C.R. I-
1663, 41 (stating that while national authorities are entitled to prescribe
penalties, they should not be out of proportion to the offense committed); Case
C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'ordine degli avvocati e procuratori di Milano
1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 37 (stating that national measures liable to hinder the
exercise of fundamental freedoms must be justified and must not go beyond what
is necessary to obtain their objective).
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national and on the Community level. Moreover, most companies
have no, or only very limited, market power. Hence, it might be
less burdensome, but equally effective, to limit codetermination to
those companies that are actually found to exert market power.
However, neither argument is completely convincing. Given the
general principle that Member States can choose the level of
protection with regard to recognized imperative requirements," a
Member State cannot be prevented from choosing to combine
antitrust rules with other means of preventing the abuse of market
power. Moreover, it is hardly practical to limit the scope of
application of codetermination statutes to firms enjoying market
power. It would require an immense bureaucratic effort to
monitor the emergence, continued existence, and disappearance of
such power.
Finally, there does not seem to be any less burdensome, but
equally effective way of guaranteeing the integrity of the political
process. Admittedly, one can curtail or even ban financial
contributions to political parties or candidates. However, a
corporation can exert political pressure in other ways, e.g., by
threatening to move its facilities to other states, and it is hard to
see how such tactics could be prIevented effectively in a way that is
less burdensome to corporations than the existing system of
codetermination.
In sum, the criterion of necessity is unlikely to constitute an
obstacle to the justification of the German system of
codetermination.
4. No Disproportionate Burden
The burden imposed by national measures must not be out of
proportion when compared to the likely benefits.3" Although the
302 See, e.g., Case 120/78, REWE-Zentrale-AG v.
Bundesmonopolverwaltung fdr Branttwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
303. See, e.g., Case C-470/93, Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe
K61n v. Mars GmbH, 1995 E.C.R. 1-1923, $ 15 (stating that provisions which
place a burden on intra-Community trade are permissible if they are
proportionate to the objective pursued); REWE-Zentrale-AG, 1979 E.C.R. 649,
IT 8, 13 (stating that national laws related to alcohol marketing must only be
accepted insofar as necessary to achieve the social objectives desired).
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Court sometimes fails to mention this requirement," there is
general agreement that this balancing test is part of the imperative
requirements doctrine."5
Concerning the protection of workers and the improvement of
working conditions, it will be hard for the Court to argue that the
burden imposed on corporations is disproportionate. The same is
true with regard to the protection of the integrity of the political
process: Given the ongoing criticism regarding the democratic
legitimacy of the European Community,3"6 the Court has a
powerful motivation not to give the impression that it does not
take the integrity of the political process seriously.
As concerns the prevention of the abuse of market power, the
situation is more difficult. In my view, one could argue that the
marginal benefits of imposing codetermination in addition to
existing antitrust rules is sufficiently small and uncertain for the
corresponding burden to be considered disproportionate.
However, it is hard to predict how the Court would view this issue.
In any case, given that the German system of codetermination does
not impose a disproportionate burden with regard to the other
three objectives described above, this question is unlikely to be
decisive.
5. The Absence of Discrimination
Finally, a national measure restricting the fundamental
freedoms can only be justified under the imperative requirements
304. See, e.g., Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen,
1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, 34 (stating that the following four conditions for national
measures must be considered: "they must be applied in a non-discriminatory
manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest;
they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they
pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it").
305. See, e.g., WILMOWSKY, supra note 259, at 15; MOLLER-GRAFF, supra note
230, at 715 231.
306. Cf., e.g., PAUL CRAIG, The Nature of the Community: Integration,
Democracy, and Legitimacy, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 1, 23-30 (Paul
Craig & Grdinne de Bdrca eds., 1998); JOSEPH WEILER, European Models:
Polity, People and System, in LAWMAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 1, 1-20
(Paul Craig & C. Harlow eds., 1998).
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doctrine if it applies in a non-discriminatory manner.3"
As explained in Part II of this article, the German system of
codetermination does not discriminate overtly against pseudo-
foreign corporations. However, if the corporate law under which
the corporation is formed does not allow the corporation to comply
with the German system of codetermination, the application of the
German codetermination law necessarily leads to a "hidden" or
"indirect" discrimination. 8 The question, therefore, is whether
such indirect discrimination also prevents a national measure from
being justified on the grounds of the imperative requirements
doctrine.
The Court tends to be rather inconsistent in its rulings."n On
several occasions, the Court has considered national measures to
be justified, even though they clearly amounted to indirect
discrimination.'3 This case law has led Advocate General Tesauro
307. See, e.g., Centros Ltd., 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, 34 (stating that national
measures that restrict fundamental freedoms must be applied in a non-
discriminatory manner); Case C-19/92, Kraus v. Land Baden-Wtirtemberg, 1993
E.C.R. 1-1663, 28 (stating that "Community law sets limits to the exercise of
those powers by the Member States in so far as provisions of national law
adopted in that connection must not constitute an obstacle to the effective
exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Articles 48 and 52 of the
[EC] Treaty."); Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'ordine degli avvocati e
procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 37 (stating that national measures
that restrict fundamental freedoms must be applied in a non-discriminatory
manner).
308. See supra Part II.A.
309. See the (somewhat polemical) criticism by the Advocate General
Tesauro in his joined opinion regarding case, Decker v. Caisse de maladie des
employes prives. Joined Opinion of the Advocate General Tesauro, Decker v.
Caisse de maladie des employes prives, 1998 E.C.R. 1-1831, 49, 50 (stating that
the Court should adopt a singular approach to national measures, with a
preference toward keeping some measures applicable, regardless of indirect
discrimination, as his is "more in keeping with the case-law in this area
considered as a whole.").
310. See, e.g., Case C-204/90, Bachmann v. Belgium, 1992 ECR 1-249; [1993]
30 C.M.L.R. 785 (holding that the deductibility of insurance contributions is
contrary to the EC Treaty, but may be justified by the need to maintain the
national tax system). In some cases, such as Aher-Waggon v. Germany, the Court
simply considered a national measure justified by imperative requirements
without addressing the problem that the measure was indirectly discriminatory.
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to suggest that national measures discriminating indirectly against
the nationals of foreign Member States can still be "applicable
without distinction" and can therefore be justified under the
imperative requirements doctrine.31 ' However, in other decisions,
the Court has stated explicitly that national measures
discriminating indirectly against foreign nationals cannot be
justified under the imperative requirements doctrine.312 Given the
See Case 389/96, Aher-Waggon v. Germany, 1998 E.C.R. 1-4473. In other cases,
the Court has basically argued that indirect discrimination can only exist where
the foreign and domestic products are comparable in that a sufficient reason for
distinguishing between the two is lacking. See, e.g., Case 113/80, Commission v.
Ireland, 1981 E.C.R. 1625 (discussing whether souvenirs produced abroad are to
be treated in the same manner as souvenirs produced in the country where the
souvenir is sold). Thus the Court has defined the notion of discrimination in such
a way as to include the absence of a justification for different treatment. See
supra note 309. This line of reasoning allows the Court to avoid stating that an
indirectly discriminatory measure can be justified under the imperative
requirements doctrine, but it is a purely formal question whether a reasonable
consideration is considered to prevent the existence of discrimination or whether
the same consideration is classified as a justification for the same difference in
treatment. See Opinion of Advocate General, Case 203/96, Chemische
Afvalstoffen Dusseldorp BV v. Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelikjke
Ordening en Milieubeer, 1998 E.C.R. 1-4075, 90 (expressing criticism and
accusing the Court of resorting to "rather tortuous reasoning"). Cf. also
Dusseldorp, 1998 E.C.R 1-4075, 1$ 44, 49 (where the Court left open whether a
discriminatory restriction on exports could be justified on environmental
grounds).
311. See Joined Opinion of the Advocate General Tesauro, Case C-120/95,
Nicolas Decker v. Caisse de Maladie des Employes Prives, 1998 E.C.R. 1-1831,
50. In the context of measures aiming at the protection of the environment, a
similar suggestion has been made by Advocate General Jacobs. See Opinion of
Advocate General Jacobs, Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag AG,
2001 E.C.R. 1, 233 (arguing where such measures necessarily have a
discriminatory impact, the possibility that they may be justified should not be
excluded); see also Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola, Case C-302/97,
Klaus Konle v. Republik Osterreich, 1999 E.C.R. 1-3099, 15 (stating that "the
rules in the present case make no reference to the nationality of those to whom
they are addressed and may be regarded in that respect as applicable without
distinction").
312. Case C-224/97, Erich Ciola v. Land Vorarlberg, 1999 E.C.R. 1-2517,
14-16 (holding that quota systems which restrict the number of moorings that
may be allocated to non-national boat owners are not justified under the
imperative requirements doctrine); Case 231/83, Cullet v. Leclerc 1985 E.C.R.
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above-mentioned inconsistencies, it cannot surprise that legal
scholars, too, disagree as to whether indirectly discriminating
national measures can be justified under the imperative
requirements doctrine."3
In my view, it is very likely that the Court will, at least in the
long run, allow the justification of national measures that
discriminate indirectly."' Otherwise, the Court would have to
accept highly inefficient outcomes: x. If indirectly discriminating
measures could not be justified under the imperative requirements
doctrine, they could only be justified under the provisions of the
EC Treaty that explicitly allow for the justification of
discriminating national measures.316 However, these provisions,
305, T T 30, 31h (stating that the imperative requirements doctrine does not justify
minimum price requirements on imported fuel); Case 229/83, Cullet v. Leclerc,
1985 E.C.R. 1, T 29 (rejecting the French government's argument that
"safeguarding of consumers' interests" and "protection of creativity and cultural
diversity" justify fixing prices on imported books under the imperative
requirements doctrine).
313. Some scholars state explicitly that indirectly discriminatory measures
cannot be justified under the imperative requirements doctrine. See, e.g., FRANK
EMMERT, EUROPARECHT 48 (1996); Hans D. Jarass, Die Niederlassungsfreiheit in
der Europdiischen Gemeinschaft [The Freedom of Establishment in the European
Community], 38 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFr [RIW] 1, 6 (1993)
(stating that legal scholars are not all in agreement as to how much indirect
discrimination of foreigners is acceptable). Others come to the opposite
conclusion. See, e.g., LACKHOFF, supra note 106, at 458; PETER VON WILMOWSKY,
ABFALLWIRTSHCAF IM BINNENMARKT [THE WASTE DISPOSAL INDUSTRY IN
THE COMMON MARKET] 157-60 (1990) (stating that members of Court of Justice
and other legal scholars have competing views as to weather national measures
are justified in indirectly discriminate against foreigners under the imperative
requirements doctrine).
314. Cf. also Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Case C-379/98,
PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag AG, 2001 E.C.R. 1-2099, 227 (arguing that
the Court may be reconsidering its earlier case law and may now be tending to
the view that even discriminatory measures can sometimes be justified by
imperative requirements).
315. Cf. VON WILMOWSKY, supra note 266, at 160 (criticizing the lack of a
balancing test).
316. Cf. Case C-224/97, Erich Ciola, 1999 E.C.R. 1-2517, 16 (pointing out
that "[n]ational rules which are not applicable to services without
distinction ... are compatible with Community law only if they can be brought
within the scope of an express derogation, such as Article 56 of the EC Treaty.")
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such as Article 46(1) of the EC Treaty in the context of the
freedom of establishment, only allow very limited grounds for
justifying national measures, such as the protection of public
health, public security, or public policy.317 By contrast, national
measures serving other legislative goals of fundamental importance
would be held invalid, simply because they affect citizens from
other Member States more severely than they affect the Member
State's own nationals."1
In the field of corporate law, the consequences would be
particularly far-reaching. Given that the law of a Member State
becomes discriminatory as soon as it is incompatible with the law
of the state of incorporation,319 the state of incorporation could
artificially create a discriminatory effect in order to enable its
corporations to avoid the legislation of their host state. It is
unlikely that the Court will accept this rather inequitable
consequence.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the German legislature could probably extend the
scope of application of the German law of codetermination to
cover pseudo-foreign companies without violating the freedom of
establishment.
The German system of codetermination restricts the freedom
of establishment of foreign corporations, but this restriction is for
the most part justified under the so-called imperative requirements
doctrine. Admittedly, the Court is unlikely to accept the claim that
the democratization of corporate decision-making constitutes an
imperative requirement per se or that codetermination is necessary
in order to protect human dignity. However, Germany will be able
(citing Case 352/85, Bond van Adverteerders and Others v. Neth. State, 1988
ECR 2085).
317. Cf. Opinion of Advocate General Colomer, Case C-17/00, Francois De
Coster v. College des bourgmestre et echevins de Watermael-Boitsfort, 2001
E.C.R. 1-9445, 130 (arguing that discriminatory measures are compatible with
Community law, if authorized by an express provision contained in the Treaty).
318. See id. $ 133 (holding tax ownership of satellite dishes has nothing to do
with public policy or public safety and is therefore discriminatory).
319. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
2003]
686 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VIII
FINANCIAL LAW
to argue that the protection of workers from their employers, the
improvement of working conditions, the prevention of the abuse of
market power, and the protection of the integrity of the political
process constitute imperative requirements, and that
codetermination is an effective, necessary and proportionate
means of pursuing these requirements.
In some respects, the German law of codetermination will
have to be modified. In particular, the German legislature will not
be able to extend the Coal and Steel Codetermination Act to
pseudo-foreign companies. Moreover, existing loopholes in the
law of codetermination will have to be eliminated. All in all,
however, the speculations that the German system of
codetermination will not survive Centros are misplaced. It follows
that Germany corporate law is unlikely to follow the U.S. example
by focusing almost exclusively on the maximization of shareholder
wealth. Rather, German corporate law will continue to focus on
the interests of workers as well as on those of shareholders.
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